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 Oligopolistic Manufacturing and Economic Reform in 
 
 Four Archetype Western Pacific Economies: 
 
Model Construction and Analysis 
 
Abstract 
 
 To examine the effects of policy intervention in the presence of imperfect competition in 
manufacturing, general equilibrium models are constructed of four Western Pacific economies, 
chosen according to their level of development and the comparative sizes of their manufacturing 
sectors.  The countries chosen are Australia, an industrialised importer of manufactures, Japan, 
an industrialised exporter, the Philippines, a developing importer, and the Republic of Korea, a 
developing exporter.  In each case the manufacturing sector is characterised as comprising nine 
separate industries, each with identical oligopolistic firms producing homogeneous goods which 
are differentiated from competing imports.  The economies are subjected to exogenous shocks, 
which include trade reforms, increased surveillance of pricing behaviour, technological change 
and shifts in the terms of trade.  Differences in the simulated economic responses in each case 
are examined and discussed.  This paper also offers a complete specification of the model used 
and a detailed description of the construction of databases for the four countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
 From the mid 1980s, governments in most industrial economies cast about more 
zealously than before in search of sources of renewed internal growth.  The impetus for this was 
a pervasive trend toward higher unemployment since the early 1970s.  In developing countries, 
on the other hand, the debt crisis of the early 1980s exposed their governments to increased 
external pressure to improve aggregate productivity.  This, combined with the demonstration 
effect of better growth performance in the comparatively open, comparatively undistorted Asian 
developing economies, led to growth-oriented reforms throughout the developing world.  
Common elements in the reforms in both industrial and developing economies were trade 
liberalisation (the removal of exchange controls and non-tariff barriers, combined with 
commitments to reduce tariff levels) and competition-enhancing changes to policies governing 
the behaviour of domestic firms.  In Australia, both elements came under the general rubric 
"microeconomic reform". 
 This paper examines the effects of two such reforms in the context of the late 1980s.  
These are the removal of trade barriers and more competitive (non-collusive) pricing behaviour 
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by manufacturing firms, the latter being achieved through improvements in competition law and 
trade practices surveillance.  To aid the comparison of their respective effects, both policy 
reforms are examined in the context of a general equilibrium model which incorporates 
oligopoly behaviour in manufacturing in the manner of Harris (1984).1  And the generality of the 
results obtained is enhanced by fitting the model to four differently structured yet archetypal 
Western Pacific economies of the late 1980s.  The countries chosen are Australia, an 
industrialised importer of manufactures, Japan, an industrialised exporter, the Philippines, a 
developing importer, and the Republic of Korea, a developing exporter. 
 In Section 2 a brief description of the model is provided.  Section 3 then discusses the 
structure of the four economies and the behavioural implications of the model's characterisation 
of their manufacturing sectors.  Section 4 presents the results from trade reform experiments and 
Section 5 the results from pricing behaviour reform.  Conclusions are then offered in Section 6 
and the paper is supplemented by two substantial appendices.  The first of these details the 
formulation of the model while the second describes its construction, detailing the sources of 
data and parameter estimates in its application to all four economies. 
 
2. The Model 
 In order to highlight the role of imperfect competition in the analysis of trade policy, yet keep the 
model manageable, its structure has been made simpler than many modern computable general 
equilibrium models.2  Institutions, including government, are represented by a single consuming 
household with Cobb-Douglas preferences among types of goods and CES subaggregation of home 
goods with imports.  A complete mathematical description of the model and its solution is given in 
Appendix 1. 
 Firms in all 12 sectors are oligopolistic in their product pricing behaviour, each holding 
calibrated conjectural variations.  Each also bears fixed capital and skilled labour costs, enabling the 
                                                 
1 There is, of course, a substantial literature which sees trade reform as competition-enhancing in domestic markets 
(Hertel 1994; Ianchovichina et al. 2000).  In the approach adopted here this effect is very slight and it is useful to 
examine separately the effects of more substantial changes in the pricing behaviour of firms. 
2 The model is a substantially revised and extended version of that used by Gunasekera and Tyers (1990). 
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representation of unrealised economies of scale.  But home products in each sector are homogeneous and 
output is Cobb-Douglas in variable factors and intermediate inputs.  The latter are Cobb-Douglas 
aggregates of home and imported products.3  The existence of oligopoly power in product markets 
notwithstanding, firms are price takers in the markets for both primary factors and intermediate inputs. 
 The five primary factors are capital, skilled labour, unskilled labour, arable land and 
mineral/energy resources.  Assumptions about their mobility are summarized in Table 1.  In the length of 
run assumed, capital is homogeneous and fully mobile internationally while the domestic endowments of 
the other factors are fixed.  Land and mineral resources are sector-specific in all lengths of run.  
Domestically-owned capital is fixed in quantity, so that changes in the domestic capital stock affect the 
level of income repatriated abroad and hence they have implications for the balance of payments.  
Depending on the closure chosen, however, firms need not earn market returns on capital in this model.  
If, for example, the entry and exit of firms are prohibited (or even if they are costly) then pure economic 
profits or losses occur. 
 The economy modelled is "almost small" following Harris (1984).  It has no power to influence 
the border prices of its imports but its exports are differentiated from competing products abroad and 
hence face finite-elastic demand.  An exchange rate is defined and its value set to retain any gap in the 
current account of the balance of payments evident from the model database.  Real depreciations 
calculated as needed to hold this degree of imbalance raise the relative cost of imports in the 
home market and lower the prices of exports relative to competing goods in foreign markets.  
The numeraire used is a consumer price index, the quantities in which are drawn from the reference 
database (social accounting matrix, or SAM).  This database is presented in full in Appendix 2. 
 The model is solved using two "Walrasian adjustment" algorithms.  If firm entry and exit are 
prohibited, corresponding to the "short run" closure of Harris (1984), the exchange rate and the prices of 
the four factors which are not internationally mobile are adjusted to remove any payments imbalance and 
to achieve the appropriate degree of factor market clearance.  If firm entry and exit are permitted, this 
solution is embedded in a second iterative process which adjusts the numbers of firms in each sector until 
                                                 
3 Since the elasticities of substitution between home goods and imports in final demand are generally greater than 
unity, this implies, reasonably, that products are less substitutable as intermediate inputs than in final demand. 
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incentives for entry and exit no longer exist.4 
 The five primary factors are capital, skilled labour, unskilled labour, arable land and 
mineral/energy resources.  In the length of run assumed, capital is homogeneous and fully 
mobile internationally while the domestic endowments of the other factors are fixed.  Land and 
mineral resources are sector-specific in all lengths of run.  Domestically-owned capital is fixed 
in quantity, so that changes in the domestic capital stock affect the level of income repatriated 
abroad and hence they have implications for the balance of payments.  But, depending on the 
closure chosen, firms need not earn market returns on capital in this model.  If, for example, 
entry and exit of firms are prohibited (or even if they are costly) then economic profits or losses 
occur. 
3. Economic Structure and Behaviour 
 All four economies are characterised by social accounting matrices (SAMs) assembled from 
input output tables and other data for the mid-1980s and aggregated so as to include 12 sectors and the 
five primary factors listed in Table 1.  The assembly of these datasets and the calibration of the four 
models from them are described in Appendix 2.  A recurring difficulty with our comparison of different 
economies in comparative statics is that such data are not available annually.  It is therefore impossible to 
construct the data bases for all four economies for the same year or to average out idiosyncratic business 
and political cycle effects.  The result is four SAMs representing different years and different departures 
from long run economic trends.  For Australia, Japan, the Philippines and Korea the years selected are 
1986, 1985, 1983 and 1985, respectively.  For Australia, Japan and Korea, the departures from trend are 
associated with the extraordinary boom period of the 1980s.  For the Philippines, 1983 was a year of 
comparatively poor performance associated with the collapse of the Marcos regime.  As a consequence, 
the pure profits observed, particularly in Australia and Japan, are probably higher than the manufacturing 
sector could expect to maintain in normal years, while net losses observed in the Philippines are also 
atypical.  In the course of our stylised characterisation of each economy, it will occasionally be useful to 
bear these departures in mind. 
                                                 
4 Since the applications described herein the model has been written in the Gempack software, which does not 
require so structured a solution algorithm.  See Tyers (2004a). 
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 The size and sectoral structure of the four economies is suggested by Table 2.  There are obvious 
disparities in overall size, with that of Japan having more than twice the population of the next most 
populous country and about ten times the output of the next wealthiest country, measured at market 
exchange rates.  Nevertheless, the desired contrast between the two developed and the two developing 
economies is evident.  The GDP per capita of the former is more than double that of the latter, even when 
the International Comparison Program (ICP) measure is used.  Moreover, the service sector is 
comparatively large in both the developed economies, while agriculture remains a substantial contributor 
to GDP in both the developing economies. 
 The manufacturing sector, to which we give emphasis in this study, contributes more than a 
quarter of total GDP in Japan and the developing countries.  Where the roles of manufacturing are 
contrasted is in the balance of payments, which is depicted in Table 3.  In both Australia and the 
Philippines, about nine per cent of GDP is spent on net imports of manufactures.  In Japan and Korea, on 
the other hand, net manufacturing exports amount to eight and five per cent of GDP, respectively.  It is, 
however, important to bear in mind the contrast in the overall sizes of the countries' respective 
manufacturing sectors.  Even using ICP measures, that in Japan is six times larger than that in Korea and 
15 times larger than those in either Australia or the Philippines.  This immediately suggests the presence 
of more firms in each manufacturing industry, and/or the greater likelihood that potential economies of 
scale in each are more frequently realised in Japan than elsewhere.5 
 The components of the balance of payments listed in Table 3 clearly show the relatively 
substantial dependence of Japan and Korea on manufacturing export earnings.  For the three countries 
other than Japan, there was considerable intra-industry trade in manufactures, with manufactures having a 
dominant share in imports.  For each country the capital account is modelled as closed, with the net 
income component of the current account comprising repatriated capital earnings.  Transfers, which also 
enter the current account, are derived in the construction of SAMs as a balancing item.  Given the 
abstract representation of the economies by these SAMs this item cannot be considered an accurate 
                                                 
5 Greater product diversity and differentiation are probably also associated with the larger volume of Japanese 
manufacturing.  Moreover, it is possible that external economies exist which, because of its size, enhance the 
overall productivity of Japanese manufacturing.  Although these effects have not been quantified here, their 
potential role is discussed later in the text. 
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estimate of actual transfers.  Given the structure of the model, which has no saving or investment 
demand6, these transfers might be considered as including net inflows on the capital accounts of the four 
economies. 
 Factor intensities in each sector are summarised in Table 4.  Notably, in the two industrial 
countries manufacturing is labour intensive compared with the other sectors.  In the developing countries, 
manufacturing tends to be more intensive in capital (at least relative to labour) than the other sectors. 
 In the model, each sector comprises a number of identical oligopolistic firms and each firm bears 
recurrent fixed costs.  Were average variable costs constant, this would imply forever declining average 
total costs.  Minimum efficient scale (MES) in this context is defined (following Harris) as the level of 
output at which average cost exceeds marginal cost by one per cent.  The magnitude of recurrent fixed 
costs then depends on the MES and the slope of the average cost curve.  Our estimates for these 
parameters are derived using the Harris approach, as explained in Appendix 2.  Of course, to cover these 
fixed costs, firms must be able to set prices above their average variable costs.  Their capacity to do this 
without being undercut by competitors determines the potential for either the entry of new firms (the 
coverage of additional fixed costs) or earning pure profits.  If entry is free, pure profits attract new 
entrants and the mark-up over variable costs is exhausted entirely by fixed costs.  This is the case of 
"inefficient entry" (Eastman and Stykolt 1966, Horstman and Markusen 1986).  The key, therefore, to the 
characterisation of imperfectly competitive manufacturing firms is in their product pricing behaviour and, 
in particular, their capacity to maintain mark-ups over average variable costs.7  Since both this and the 
extent of excessive entry depend on measures of the number of "representative" identical firms, we turn 
next to our estimation of firm numbers. 
 
The number of representative identical firms: 
                                                 
6 The structure might be considered as implying that savings and investment are equal and that the product 
composition of investment demand is the same as that of final demand.  If investment were to exceed savings, 
creating net inflows on the capital account that contribute to the balancing item identified in this model, the same 
assumption is implied about the composition of investment demand at home. 
7 Throughout this research, firms are assumed to be price takers in the markets for primary factors.  Labour 
markets, for example, are assumed perfectly competitive, variations in average wages between sectors are explained 
in this model as due to differences in the skill mix. 
 8
 The best measure for the representative number of identical firms in each imperfectly 
competitive sector would require a very high level of disaggregation of the manufacturing industries in 
all four economies, beyond the resources available to this project.  The necessity to work with only 12 
industry categories stretches the assumption that firms in each are identical.   Since the distribution of 
firm size in such broadly defined industry categories often exhibits a modest number of very large firms 
and a large number of small firms.  We chose to interpret this pattern as representing small numbers of 
oligopolistic leading firms depending upon large numbers of relatively competitive suppliers of 
components.8  It is then most realistic to model this as an oligopoly among the large firms, each of which 
incorporates its suppliers of components.  In all four countries, the size distribution of manufacturing 
firms is available in terms of employment.  The number of representative firms was then chosen as that 
including firms with more than 200 employees in the Philippines (WB 1987), more than 300 in Japan 
(Statistics Bureau 1986), and more than 500 in Australia (ABS 1989) and the Republic of Korea (UN 
1987). 
 
Unrealised scale economies: 
 A crude indication of the extent to which there had been inefficient entry can be obtained from 
the ratio of the MES and the average output of representative firms in each industry, as in Table 5.  The 
extent to which this exceeds unity indicates the level of unrealised scale economies.  For manufacturing 
as a whole, these appear to have been largest in the two net importers of manufactures.  Indeed, the 
ranking on unrealised scale economies was precisely the opposite of that on the size of the manufacturing 
sector (Table 2).  In Japan, scale economies in manufacturing seem to have been exhausted except in 
food processing.  In pre-microeconomic-reform Australia, they remained unexploited in both light 
manufacturing intensive in labour, including food processing and textiles and clothing, and also in heavy 
manufacturing, particularly in the production of paper, transport equipment and machinery.  In the 
developing economies, it was in the heavy industries that they remained unexploited (manufacturing, 
including chemicals, transport equipment and other machinery) where fixed costs were comparatively 
                                                 
8 This characterisation seems particularly appropriate in the cases of Japan and Korea, where large oligopolistic 
firms have large numbers of smaller affiliates which supply inputs.  See, for example, Fruin (1992). 
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high. 
 The shares of fixed costs in the total payments to capital and labour are listed in Table 6.  These 
were clearly high in industries where scale economies were unexploited, signifying prior excessive entry. 
 In spite of the ranking of the four economies mentioned earlier, and that both Australia and the 
Philippines had import-competing manufacturing sectors, fixed costs appear to have made up a greater 
proportion of the total in Australia than in the Philippines.  This is because a greater proportion of 
manufacturing product in the Philippines was in light, labour intensive, manufacturing. 
 The potential unit cost reduction from production at MES in each industry can be crudely 
estimated by reducing average fixed cost by a proportion based on the ratios in Table 5.  Such estimates 
are listed in Table 7.  They show that the potential for cost reductions was greatest in the heavy 
manufacturing industries of Australia, the Philippines and Korea.  Of course, these measures 
underestimate the potential for cost reductions of this sort because they omit the extent to which these 
industries supplied each other with inputs.  The full potential for such cost reductions is best estimated in 
full general equilibrium using the model. 
 
Pure profits: 
 That proportion of mark-ups over unit variable costs not absorbed by fixed costs accrues as pure 
profits.  The implied excess rate of return on capital in each of the four economies is indicated in Table 8. 
 These rates were extraordinarily high in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in Australia.  Since they are 
estimated as residuals, our measurement error is substantial.  Nevertheless, such high rates are not 
unexpected during the boom period of the mid-1980s.  They were, in any case, more modest fractions of 
total manufacturing costs, averaging 5, 11, -8 and 4 per cent in Australia, Japan, the Philippines and 
Korea, respectively. 
 
Pricing behaviour: 
 The luxuries of excessive entry and pure profits are afforded only by virtue of oligopoly pricing. 
 In setting their prices, we assume firms know the level and elasticity of sectoral demand and the number 
of their identical competitors.  They play a game in the selection of quantities.  For this comparative 
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static analysis it is convenient to abstract from the multi-period nature of this game and to represent their 
capacity to collude by a fixed conjectural variations parameter, µi, defined as the influence any individual 
firm has over the entire output of industry i.  Thus, the profit-maximising mark-up, derived by setting 
marginal revenue equal to marginal cost, vi is 
 
i
i
ii
i i
p 1(1)      =  =            im
v 1 + 
n
µ
ε
∀ , where  ii
i
Q= 
q
µ ∂∂  , 
εi is the price elasticity of demand for home goods in industry i (defined negative), ni is the number of 
firms and Qi and qi are industry and firm output.  Note that, for the conjectural variations parameter, the 
values µi = 0, 1, ni imply, respectively, perfect competition, non-collusive (Cournot) oligopoly or a 
colluding cartel. 
 The product of each industry can be consumed either directly, indirectly as intermediate inputs or 
it can be exported.  The elasticity εi therefore depends on the shares of the home product going to each of 
the three markets and the elasticities in each.  As explained in Appendix 1, the elasticities of final 
consumption and export demand depend principally on the elasticities of substitution between home 
goods and their foreign substitutes.  Because of the Cobb-Douglas function used for unit variable costs, 
however, those of intermediate demand tend to have magnitudes less than unity.  Importantly, in this 
formulation the precise values of εi depend only very weakly on border distortions.  When trade policy is 
changed, the principal mechanism by which εi is altered is the redistribution of demand amongst its three 
components.  Reference values for εi are listed in Table 9, along with the corresponding elasticities of 
substitution. 
 Since the mark-up in each industry covers both fixed costs and pure profits, it can be estimated as 
the ratio of the sum of these and total product value, drawn from the SAM (Appendix 2).  Indirect 
estimates of the ratios µi/ni then follow from equation (1).  We call this the index of non-competitive 
pricing.  It ranges from zero (perfect competition, zero mark-ups) to unity, or 100 per cent (perfect cartel, 
monopoly mark-ups).   The values thus calibrated are given in Table 9.  They suggest that pricing is 
generally collusive but that it is very rare that firms achieve more than a quarter of the discipline of a 
perfect cartel. 
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 To speculate on the effects of this collusion, however, it is useful to compare the calibrated ratios 
with those which would apply in a non-collusive, or Cournot, oligopoly when the ratio takes the value 
1/ni.  Its estimation depends heavily on our selection, above, of a "representative" number of firms in 
each industry.  The results, also listed in Table 10, show the smallest gulf between calibrated values and 
the non-collusive case to occurred in Australia and by far the largest in Japan.  It comes as no surprise 
that the non-collusive ratio for Japan was low.  The comparatively large size of Japan's manufacturing 
sector is associated with a correspondingly large number of oligopolistic firms.9  It follows, then, that 
policy reforms that might have reduced the capacity of firms to collude would have had their largest 
proportional effects on prices in Japan.  This is illustrated more clearly in Table 11 which lists the 
optimal mark-ups to correspond with the ratios of the previous table.  Non-collusive pricing would have 
forced the virtual disappearance of mark-ups in Japan and, to a slightly lesser extent, in Korea and the 
Philippines.  In Australia, however, where the number of firms was smallest, non-collusive mark-ups 
would have been set at about a quarter of the calibrated levels. 
 These crude calculations underestimate the cost reductions that might have stemmed from more 
competitive firm behaviour in the same way that those above on unrealised scale economies do.  Aside 
from aggregation issues, they ignore the substantial interactions among manufacturing industries via 
input markets.  Moreover, the changes in mark-ups shown in Table 11 depend on the assumption that the 
number of firms would remain fixed.  In reality, more competitive pricing would drive some firms out of 
each industry.  At the extreme of non-collusive behaviour, mark-ups would be higher than those shown.  
The best way to improve these approximations, and to measure the consequences of policy reform more 
generally, is to turn to the full general equilibrium model. 
 
4. Trade Reform 
 The 1980s pattern of protection in all four economies, summarised in Table 12, gave 
most assistance to import-competing producers.  The net importers of manufactures, Australia 
and the Philippines, both protected their manufacturing sectors and the net manufacturing 
                                                 
9 This result depends also on the subdivision of manufacturing into only nine industries each of which is here 
assumed to supply a single homogeneous product.  Product diversity in Japan was clearly greater than this and so 
the non-collusive pricing ratio would be expected to have been much larger. 
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exporters, Japan and Korea, both protected their agricultural sectors.  But the pattern was more 
complex than this.  In Australia, substantial protection was afforded the labour-intensive end of 
manufacturing, while in the Philippines the capital-intensive end was most favoured.  In Japan, 
although manufacturing protection was low overall, the food processing was highly protected.  
In Korea, although the other sectors appear to have received greater assistance, a substantial 
residue of the old import substituting regime remained through the mid-1980s, particularly in 
metals and labour-intensive manufactures.10 
 To examine the consequences of trade reform in the period and their sensitivity to model 
formulation, the following experiments are performed. 
1. A reference equilibrium is calculated to reproduce the model databases on the assumption that 
manufacturing firms were perfectly competitive and had constant returns to scale.11 
2. All trade distortions are removed and a new equilibrium is calculated on the assumption that 
firms are perfectly competitive. 
3. The original model, incorporating imperfectly competitive behaviour, is then used to calculate 
a new "no-entry" reference equilibrium which also reproduces the observed pattern of pure 
profits. 
4. All trade distortions are removed and a new, no-entry equilibrium is calculated. 
5. Trade distortions are reinstated and a "free entry" reference equilibrium is calculated.  This 
solution allows firms to enter and exit until pure profits are competed away. 
6. Again, all trade distortions are removed, this time under "free entry" conditions. 
 Thus, three reference equilibria are compared with a corresponding three in which all 
trade distortions are removed.  The resulting estimates of the impacts of trade reform on the size 
and structure of the four economies are summarised in Table 13.  Most striking at the outset is 
that the estimates are robust across the three different formulations of the model.  Allowance for 
                                                 
10 The protection of services, which are consolidated in this study, is difficult to gauge from available publications 
of the period.  Although it is set to zero in the industrial countries, this is unlikely to be accurate (Dee and Hanslow 
2000). 
11 Pure profits in this adjusted database are absorbed into market returns on capital and the capital stock and its 
distribution allowed to adjust to retain the original rate of return on capital. 
 13
imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale appears to change value added effects 
little.  Because a precise index of product prices is used as the numeraire, changes in the welfare 
of the single integrated household are correctly indicated by changes in real GNP.  As in 
numerous prior studies of trade reforms, the net welfare gains in economic welfare are small but 
uniformly positive.  This is in spite of some correspondingly small declines in GDP, driven by 
net reductions in the capital stock as comparatively capital intensive industries shrink following 
the loss of their protection. 
 The structural change that underlies these small changes in overall economic size is 
substantial, however.  Manufacturing shrinks where it had been protected and expands where 
protection is removed elsewhere.  Mining and energy are the big beneficiaries in Australia and 
the Philippines.  Agriculture does not benefit in Australia, for two reasons.  First, it had, at the 
outset, enjoyed some protection.  A post-reform real devaluation does less than offset the loss of 
that protection.  And second, per unit of output, the agricultural sector is more dependent than 
mining on chemical and fuel inputs, the real costs of which rise after the reform.  In Korea and 
Japan, on the other hand, agriculture shrinks while manufacturing expands.12 
 This structural change is reflected in the associated changes in the unit rewards of 
domestic factors, given in Table 14.  Capital owners are largely indifferent in all formulations by 
virtue of the assumed international mobility of that factor.  Only in the no entry equilibria do 
pure profits occur but the changes in these which accompany trade reform are negligible.  The 
corresponding changes in real unit rewards to domestic factors (those not mobile internationally) 
are more dramatic, however.  Mineral and energy resource rents increase substantially in 
Australia and the Philippines while agricultural land rents decline in Japan and Korea.  Real 
wages rise throughout.  Although all closures of the model set wages to clear labour markets, 
these increases in real wages confirm that even constant real wage solutions would not yield 
increased unemployment.13  Where the beneficiaries of trade reform are the comparatively 
                                                 
12 The latter expansion is greatest in the case of Korea where the large services sector had been characterised as 
receiving a high level of protection.  The services sector shrinks so as to benefit manufacturing both through the 
supply of cheaper service inputs and through its release of domestic factors the unit rewards to which would 
otherwise have shown larger increases. 
13 In the course of each solution, however, trade reform lowers the domestic price level and nominal wages most 
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capital intensive mining and energy sectors, the demand for labour is nevertheless boosted by 
increased demand for service inputs to that sector.  Declines in real land rents in Australia, Japan 
and Korea aside, domestic factors are gainers from trade reform.14 
 The response to trade reform by the imperfectly competitive manufacturing sector is 
summarised in Table 15.  Consider first the no entry closure and the two countries in which a 
previously protected manufacturing sector contracts.  Trade reform reduces the relative prices of 
competing imported manufactures.  This is partially offset by real devaluations and lower home 
prices due to the reduced cost of imported intermediates, which also enhance the 
competitiveness of exports abroad.  Home products are redistributed away from final (and, to a 
lesser extent, intermediate) demand to meet increased export demand.  This increases the 
elasticity of demand facing home manufacturers very slightly.  Mark-ups, as given by equation 
(1), fall but by very little.  Thus, there is no significant "pro-competitiveness" effect of trade 
reform in this case.15  Pure profits change very little and the changes in the scale of production, 
corresponding with the associated changes in output at the industry level, are too small to 
significantly affect average fixed costs. 
 In the free entry closure, trade reform first induces pure losses in both the Australian and 
the Philippine manufacturing sectors.  This forces three per cent of firms in Australia and five 
per cent of firms in the Philippines to exit.  Instead of making pricing behaviour more 
competitive, however, it raises the index of imperfectly competitive pricing (Table 10) and 
increases mark-ups (though only very slightly16).  Whether the firms which remain produce at a 
more efficient scale then depends on the change in industry output.  If this declines by less than 
the reduction in the number of firms, as in Australia, then value added per firm rises.  Any scale 
                                                                                                                                                                          
often fall (but, by less than the price level).  Sticky nominal wages would therefore cause increased unemployment 
following trade reform.  For an analysis of the effects of nominal wage rigidity following trade reform, see Rees 
and Tyers (2004). 
14 That these gains are most often larger than those in real GNP reflects the loss of tariff revenue, previously 
transferred directly to households, and its replacement by increased factor income. 
15 For a more complete discussion of pro-competitive effects, see Hertel (1994), Ianchovichina et al. (2000) and 
Hertel et al. (2002). 
16 The elasticity of the mark-up to the index of competitive pricing, when the elasticity of demand is about two 
(Table 5), is about 0.1.  Thus, a five per cent reduction in the number of firms induces a 0.5 per cent increase in the 
mark-up. 
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gain is offset by more collusive pricing, however.   In Japan and Korea, on the other hand, trade 
reform enhances the overall profitability of manufacturing, induces entry by a small number of 
additional firms and the sector expands enough to ensure that value added per manufacturing 
firm increases.  The reform is unambiguously pro-competitive in these countries but, again, the 
changes are so slight as to have an almost negligible effect on prices. 
 
5. Non-Collusive Pricing 
 Firms are here assumed to be induced to price without collusion through revisions to 
competition law and more active trade practices surveillance.  In both the no entry and the free 
entry cases, the model is shocked with reductions in the index of imperfectly competitive pricing 
from µi/ni to 1/ni.  In general, this forces substantial reductions in mark-ups and hence in product 
prices in the manufacturing sector.  Domestic demand shifts away from imports toward home 
products and export demand increases as lower export prices cause substitution abroad.  The 
decline in import volume, and the associated rise in export volume, causes a real appreciation 
and hence a decline in the general price level.  Output expands in all sectors, raising demand for 
domestic factors, real unit rewards to which rise. 
 The net effects on the size and structure of the economy are summarised in Table 16.  
The gains in aggregate welfare (as indicated by real GNP), and in output (GDP) are large by 
comparison with those due to trade reform.  In the no entry closure all sectors tend to expand 
their value added.  The Philippines is the single exception, for reasons to be returned to later.  
Agriculture is a consistent beneficiary, though the expansion in manufacturing comes at the cost 
of substantial pure losses, incurred by firms unable to exit.  This quite large expansion is the 
consequence of the demand boost in response to reduced mark-ups and hence lower 
manufacturing product prices.  The gains in GDP in this case are tempered by the transition 
from pure profits in manufacturing to pure losses. 
 Price reform yields even larger net gains in welfare and output in the free entry case.  
Then, the pure losses initially induced by lower manufacturing product prices cause more than 
half the firms to exit.  As they do so, mark-ups rise again, but to values well short of their pre-
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reform levels.  The burden of recurrent fixed costs is substantially reduced by the decline in the 
number of firms so value added in manufacturing (factor cost) shrinks.  But the volume of 
output (and hence the cost of variable factors) is universally larger.  The increases in this volume 
are smaller than those which occur in the no entry case because mark-ups are higher and hence 
the expansion in aggregate demand for manufactures is smaller.  Even more important than the 
differences in mark-ups in moderating the expansion in demand for home goods is that the 
reduction in the number of firms and hence in the fixed capital stock in manufacturing is so 
large that expansions in the other sectors are insufficient to prevent declines, of between three 
and nine per cent, in the overall capital stock.  These changes are large in proportion to the 
foreign owned part of that stock and hence there is a big decline in repatriated returns on capital 
in the balance of payments.  This magnifies the real revaluation which occurs, lowering the 
relative cost of imported substitutes.  The free entry closure yields larger gains in welfare and 
GDP because the burden of fixed costs is reduced and the reform induces no pure losses. 
 The changes in real unit rewards to domestic factors are summarised in Table 17.  Apart 
from the loss of pure profits by domestic capital owners in the no entry case, gains are virtually 
universal.  They are larger in the no entry case than in the free entry case since, in the latter, 
oligopoly rents are larger and these accrue to capital, part of the income from which leaks 
abroad.  The only declines are in mineral and energy rents in the Philippines (no entry case) and 
in the skilled wage in Korea (free entry case).  The latter arises because recurrent fixed costs 
include skilled labour costs.  When the number of firms declines, fixed costs are reduced 
proportionally and hence the demand for fixed skilled labour also declines.  This source of 
demand for skilled labour is comparatively large in Korea and so the change is sufficient to 
reduce overall demand for skilled labour. 
 The extent of some of the changes in manufacturing industry structure is indicated in 
Table 18.  In the no entry case, where the decline in home product prices is most substantial, 
capital is drawn into manufacturing to meet increased demand.  This increase in product volume 
raises value added per firm but fixed capital costs are not covered at the lower prices and what 
were pure profits under collusive pricing become pure losses.  In the free entry case, the lower 
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prices cause pure losses which are subsequently eliminated by the departure from the market of 
more than half its firms and the resulting decline in average fixed costs.  Value added per firm 
rises very substantially. 
 The industry composition of changes in value added in manufacturing is detailed in 
Table 19.  Apart from the Philippines, the industry pattern most often mirrors that for the sector 
overall.  These are dominated by the increases in variable capital use in the no entry case, on the 
one hand, and the substantial decreases in fixed capital in the free entry case.  The capital 
intensive transport equipment and machinery industries in Korea show exceptional expansion in 
the no entry case and exceptional contraction in the free entry case.  There are other departures 
from the central trend that depend on differences in economic structure and are therefore of 
special interest for particular economies.  Correspondingly, the industry pattern of non-collusive 
mark-ups, shown in Table 20, tends to mirror the manufacturing sector averages while 
exhibiting a number of interesting industry variations that differ between the economies. 
 In many respects the behaviour of the Philippines departs from the general pattern 
described here.  This has most to do with assumptions made in assembling the Philippine data 
base.  It was quickly apparent that firms in six of the manufacturing industries (garments, 
textiles and footwear; wood and paper; chemicals; mineral products; transport equipment; and 
miscellaneous manufactures) were loss-making in 1983.  These industries accounted for 60 per 
cent of manufacturing value added in that year.  Moreover, in four of these industries, prices in 
that year appeared not even to be covering average variable costs.  This made it nonsensical to 
calibrate a coefficient of imperfectly competitive pricing from equation (1) for those industries. 
 It is, however, no impediment to the reference and counterfactual equilibria in the no 
entry case.  Accordingly, that reference equilibrium incorporates the low prices charged in those 
industries.  When Cournot pricing is imposed on all firms in the counterfactual equilibrium, 
prices in former loss-making firms rise to more than cover all average costs.  Thus, in the 
Philippine no-entry case, the direction of average manufacturing prices is therefore the opposite 
of those in the other three economies.17  In the free entry case the Philippine model behaves 
                                                 
17 The reason why the minerals and energy sector contracts in the Philippines when manufacturers are forced to 
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much like the others.  For the reference free entry equilibrium, the assumption is made that, in 
more normal years, firms in loss-making industries would play Cournot and price non-
collusively.  When non-collusive pricing is imposed on all firms, mark-ups fall on less than half 
the output of the sector and hence the observed benefits are muted relative to those observed in 
the other economies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This comparison of the potential gains from trade reform and more competitive pricing 
behaviour in manufacturing suggests that the gains are larger from more competitive behaviour 
and, moreover, that they are more nearly Pareto improving.  This is most clearly true in the long 
run when free entry and exit of firms is a more appropriate assumption.  Then, where capital is 
mobile internationally, the rate of return earned by domestic capital owners is unaffected by 
either change of policy.  Whereas trade reform redistributes rents away from factors in which 
protected industries are intensive, while yielding a small net gain across the whole economy, 
more competitive pricing behaviour reduces the price level, raises the volume of home 
production and of exports and enhances the purchasing power of all non-mobile factor rewards.
 The analysis of similar reforms in the four “archetype” Western Pacific economies does 
show that the dependence of the gains from reform on economic structure is significant.  The 
specification used causes the introduction of imperfectly competitive behaviour not to yield 
large differences in the effects of trade reform on overall economic activity in any of the 
countries.  When the reforms include changes to competition policy and hence oligopoly pricing 
behaviour, however, this dependence is greatly strengthened.  The large size of Japan’s 
manufacturing sector in the 1980s and the substantial pure profits it then enjoyed, meant that the 
potential gains from competition reform would have been larger in proportion to its GNP than 
for the other countries.  This result suggests that competition reforms in Japan in the late 1980s 
might not only have boosted growth at a time when the economy was slowing but also that, with 
                                                                                                                                                                          
price non-collusively (Table 19) is that manufacturing industries which are intensive in the products of that sector 
tend to be the ones in which prices rise in this experiment.  They contract and so, therefore, does the mining and 
energy sector.  The decline in mineral rents indicated in Table 17 follows. 
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better-distributed rents, the collapse of the 1990s and the subsequent economic stagnation might 
have been mitigated or even avoided. 
 In measuring these effects, however, two important caveats suggest further research.  
First, the assumption of product homogeneity within any manufacturing industry, combined 
with a uniform sectoral disaggregation irrespective of economic size, overlooks the possibility 
that product diversity was much greater in the larger manufacturing sectors such as that of 
Japan.  It is therefore likely that the extent of any collusion in pricing is overestimated in such 
cases, and so, therefore, are the potential gains from more competitive behaviour.  The solution 
to this problem is not necessarily to jump to a differentiated products model of the Spence-Dixit-
Stiglitz type (Hertel 1994).  The same judgement must be made there about the degree of 
differentiation (or the elasticity of substitution) between varieties.  A first approximation might 
adjust the number of representative firms according to the level of product diversity.
 Second, calibrated general equilibrium models are vulnerable to the peculiarities of those 
years for which complete sets of data (principally input-output tables) are available.  The 1983 
Philippine database, for example, is extraordinary in the extent of the manufacturing losses 
incurred.  This made it difficult to calibrate the "normal" pricing behaviour of manufacturing 
firms in that country.  A larger investment is needed in database assembly in such cases.
 Finally, manufacturing is not the only sector in which oligopoly behaviour is influential. 
 Indeed, in many industrial countries the focus of pro-competitive reforms is the services sector. 
 The models used here are clearly imbalanced in their consolidation of services and further work 
might attempt an examination of imperfectly competitive behaviour in parts of that sector. 
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 Table 1  Primary factors and their mobility 
 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Factor      Mobility 
 
 Capitala      intersectoral, international 
 
 Skilled laboura     intersectoral 
 
 Unskilled labour   intersectoral 
 
 Agricultural land    sector specific 
 
 Mineral/energy resources   sector specific 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Firms have fixed capital and skilled labour costs but these factors are acquired at the same rates from the 
pool of mobile capital and skilled labour. 
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 Table 2  Economic size and structure 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Population, millions 17 124 61 43 
 
GDP, US$ billions 296 2,943 44 236 
 
GDP per capita, US$ 17,000 25,400 730 5,400 
     ICP estimatea  16,100 17,000 7,200 2,300 
 
GDP in manufacturing, US$ billions 45 829 11 66 
     ICP estimatea  41 610 35 96 
 
The distribution of GDP, % 
     Agriculture 4  3 20 13 
     Mining  4 1 6 1 
     Services  75 68 44 57 
     Manufacturing 15 28 29 29 
 
The distribution of 
  manufacturing GDP, % 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 18 11 30 12 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 6 4 10 12 
 Wood and paper products 17 4 5 4 
 Chemicals 7 7 9 21 
 Petroleum and coal products 5 4 2 2 
 Mineral products 24 17 9 6 
 Transport equiptment 8 12 4 10 
 Machinery 10 29 23 23 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 5 11 7 6 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a United Nations International Comparison Progam. 
 
Source:  Population and GDP estimates are for 1990, drawn from World Bank (1992).  GDP in 
manufacturing is for 1989, from the same source.  GDP shares are from the SAMs detailed in Appendix 2. 
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 Table 3  The balance of payments 
 
 (per cent of GDP) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Inflows 
 
 Transfersa 15 -2 19 18 
 
 Exports  16 17 17 37 
 
  Agriculture 2 .3 .7 .7 
  Minerals 4 .0 1.4 .1 
  Services 4 3 7 8 
  Manufactures 6 14 9 29 
 
 Total  31 15 36 54 
 
 
Outflows 
 
 Repatriated market returns on capital 11 3 14 9 
 
     pure profits .8 .9 -1.4 1.4 
 
 Export subsidies .7 .4 1.2 5 
 
 Imports  18 11 23 39 
 
  Agriculture .3 1.1 .3 3 
  Minerals .5 4 3.3 9 
  Services 2 2 .6 3 
  Manufactures 15 4 18 24 
 
 Total  31 15 36 54 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a A closed capital account is imagined with these current account income transfers constructed to balance 
the social accounting matrices.  Given the model’s structure they might be considered, however, as also 
including net inflows on the capital account as explained in the text. 
 
Source:  The SAMs presented in Appendix 2. 
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 Table 4  Factor proportions by industry 
 
 (Per cent expenditure on each factor group) 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Agriculture Mining & Services Manufacturing 
  Energy 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Australia Capital 25 35 36 26 
  Laboura 36 28 64 74 
  Natural resourcesa 39 37 
 
Japan  Capital 39 8 32 15 
  Labour 24 56 68 85 
  Natural resources 37 36 
 
Philippines Capital 10 27 33 70 
  Labour 60 34 67 30 
  Natural resources 30 39 
 
Korea, Rep. Capital 10 14 34 34 
  Labour 42 37 66 66 
  Natural resources 48 50 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Labour is further disaggregated into skilled and unskilled labour, while natural resources is 
disaggregated into agricultural land and mineral/energy resources.  These factor groups are consolidated in 
this table to clarify the overall labour and capital intensities. 
 
Source:  The SAMs presented in Appendix 2. 
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 Table 5   Unrealised scale economies in manufacturinga 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
All manufacturing 3.6 1.1 6.4 2.5 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 3.0 2.0 1.1 3.0 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.0 
 
 Wood and paper products 5.0 1.1 2.1 3.0 
 
 Chemicals 1.7 1.0 2.2 2.5 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 1.0 1.0 1.1 2.5 
 
 Mineral products 4.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 
 
 Transport equipment 5.0 1.0 116 3.0 
 
 Machinery 3.2 1.0 3.3 4.0 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 5.0 1.0 2.9 3.0 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The ratio of minimum efficient scale (MES) to average firm output. 
 
Source:  Estimates of MES based on those of Gupta and Fuss (1979) and adapted for application to the four 
economies, combined with estimates of the numbers of oligopolistic firms, as explained in Appendix 2. 
 m
q n * MES = 
q Q
      
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 Table 6  Share of fixed capital and labour in returns to those factors in manufacturinga, per cent 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
All manufacturing 56,  10 26,   4 21,   3 46,   8 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 55,   9 72,  12 13,   2 63,  10 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 31,   4 22,   4 2,   1 20,   4 
 
 Wood and paper products 82,  14 28,   5 10,   2 71,  12 
 
 Chemicals 34,   6 20,   3 8,   1 33,   5 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 20,   3 27,   5 89,  15 33,   5 
 
 Mineral products 55,   9 27,   5 14,   2 50,   9 
 
 Transport equipment 87,  15 28,   5 87,  15 60,  10 
 
 Machinery 32,   5 15,   2 15,   2 75,  13 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 61,  10 17,   3 15,   2 68,  11 
 
  
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Share of market returns to all capital and labour in manufacturing which is made up of returns to 
fixed capital and labour.  The denominator excludes the substantial pure profits made during the 1980s in 
Australia, Japan and Korea.  Note that fixed labour receives the skilled wage. 
 
Source:  Derived from the parameters discussed in Appendix 2 and equations (A2.8) and (A2.9). 
 s
u su s
K  Lw , 
K   +  w wL L
   
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 Table 7  Potential reductions in average cost due to the realisation 
 of potential scale economies 
 
 
 (per cent) 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Share of fixed in total cost, 
    all manufacturinga 5.8 1.8 5.5 4.2 
 
 
Potential price reductionsb 
 
 All manufacturing 4.2 .2 3.3 3.5 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 3.3 1.8 1.1 .2 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear .6 .3 .0 .1 
 
 Wood and paper products 8.2 .2 .0 .8 
 
 Chemicals 1.2 .0 2.8 3.5 
 
 Petroleum and coal products .0 .0 .8 .1 
 
 Mineral products 5.3 .0 3.5 .1 
 
 Transport equipment 7.5 .0 13.4 1.5 
 
 Machinery 2.5 .0 4.1 4.5 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 5.4 .0 3.1 3.2 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Quotient of combined fixed capital and labour costs and total cost of production (total value of 
output, excluding pure profits). 
 
b The product of (1 - q/qm) and the ratio of fixed to total cost. 
 
Source:  The cost ratios are drawn directly from the SAMs presented in Appendix 2.  The ratio of q and qm 
is from Table 5. 
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 Table 8  Rates of economic profit in manufacturinga, per cent 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
All manufacturing 9 20 -4 5 
 (Per cent of GDP) (2) (9) (-4) (5) 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 12 33 16 7 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 37 8 -7 2 
 
 Wood and paper products 14 9 -12 -27 
 
 Chemicals 21 20 -8 7 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 23 30 68 5 
 
 Mineral products 4 16 -12 -11 
 
 Transport equipment -5 16 -18 -2 
 
 Machinery 6 23 2 17 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 10 24 -4 27 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
a The ratio of pure profits to the value of the capital stock in each industry in the reference SAM.  The 
losses in the Philippines are large enough in some sectors that firms are not fully covering variable costs.  
This may well be representative of the state of that economy in 1983. 
 
Source:  All are drawn from the SAMs, as explained in Appendix 2. 
 i
iK
π      
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 Table 9  Elasticities of substitution in demand and of demand for home goodsa, per cent 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Elast. Price elasticities of demand, ε 
 of ______________________________________ 
 substn. 
 σ Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
     of Korea 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Agriculture  2.8 -2.7 -1.9 -1.9 -2.0 
 
Mining  2.8 -3.3 -2.0 -2.6 -2.1 
 
Services  1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -2.1 -1.9 
 
All manufacturingb 2.9 -2.4 -2.3 -2.5 -2.6 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 2.2 -2.4 -2.0 -2.2 -2.0 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 3.0 -2.6 -2.3 -2.9 -3.1 
 
 Wood and paper products 2.3 -2.1 -1.9 -2.4 -2.2 
 
 Chemicals 1.9 -1.8 -2.0 -1.9 -2.0 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 2.8 -2.1 -2.1 -2.1 -2.2 
 
 Mineral products 2.8 -2.4 -2.2 -2.2 -2.2 
 
 Transport equipment 5.2 -3.2 -3.0 -3.5 -2.8 
 
 Machinery 2.8 -2.7 -2.6 -3.0 -3.1 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 2.8 -2.2 -2.0 -2.3 -3.8 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The elasticity of substitution, σ, is defined positive and, for each sector, set the same in each country. 
 The elasticities of demand are with respect to home product prices.  They are for an aggregate of direct or 
final demand, intermediate demand and export demand, as explained in Appendix 1.  Unlike the elasticities 
of substitution, which are permanent parameters, these change as the mix of these three types of demand 
change. 
 
b The aggregate, for all manufactures, is an average of the component industry values, using value 
added shares as weights. 
 
Source:  The elasticities of substitution are drawn from Stern et al. (1976) and Industry Commission (1991). 
 The demand elasticities are calculated from them as indicated in Appendix 2.  
 32
 Table 10  Index of non-competitive pricinga, per cent 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
All manufacturingb 25,   7 28,  .3 14,   2 24,   2 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 24,   3 27,  .3 20,  .6 16,   2 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 19,  10 12,  .4 1,  .6 4,  .6 
 
 Wood and paper products 36,   7 15,  .3 1,  .9 6,   6 
 
 Chemicals 21,  25 27,  .3 2,   2 21,   5 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 22,  20 35,   2 11,  20 16,   1 
  
 Mineral products 24,   3 24,  .2 2,   2 1,   3 
 
 Transport equipment 22,   2 27,  .2 43,   4 3,   3 
 
 Machinery 18,   5 37,  .1 24,   1 48,  .6 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 26,  20 28,  .4 3,   3 53,   8 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The ratio of the conjectural variations parameter, µ, and the number of oligopolistic firms in each 
sector, from equation (1).  The first ratio is that observed, while the second applies to non-collusive, or 
Cournot, pricing behaviour.  The upper limit is 100 %, signifying a perfect cartel.  The lower limit is 0 %, 
signifying perfect competition. 
 
b The all-manufacturing estimates are averages across manufacturing industries, with value added 
shares as weights. 
 
Source:  The indices are calibrated using equation (1).  Once estimates of the mark-up and the elasticity of 
demand for each home product are available, the ratios listed here follow.  The mark-ups are derived from 
the SAM, and the elasticities of demand depend primarily on estimates of elasticities of substitution, as 
explained in Appendix 1.  Their estimation is explained in Appendix 2. 
 i
i i
1, 
n n
µ      
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 Table 11  Oligopoly price mark-ups over marginal cost, manufacturinga, per cent 
 
 (Cartel,  Observed,  Non-collusive or Cournot) 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
All manufacturingb 71, 12, 3.1 77, 14,  .1 67,  6,  .7 63, 10,  .6 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 71, 11, 1.1 100, 16,  .2 83, 10,  .3 100,  9,  .9 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 63,  8, 4.0 77,  6,  .2 53, .3,  .2 48,  1,  .2 
 
 Wood and paper products 91, 21, 3.3 111,  9,  .2 71, .4,  .4 83,  3, 2.9 
 
 Chemicals 125, 13, 16 100, 16,  .2 111,  1,  .8 100, 12, 2.7 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 91, 12, 11 91, 20,  .1 91,  6, 11 83,  8,  .5 
 
 Mineral products 71, 11, 1.3 83, 12,  .1 83,  .9,  .8 83,  1, 1.4 
 
 Transport equipment 45,  7,  .6 50, 10,  .1 40, 14, 1.2 56,  1, 1.0 
 
 Machinery 59,  7, 1.8 63, 17,  .0 48,  8,  .5 50, 19,  .2 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 83, 13, 10 100, 16,  .2 77,  1, 1.5 36, 16, 2.1 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
a Mark-ups over marginal cost derived using equation (1).  In the three cases included, the index of 
non-competitive pricing (µ/n) is set at unity, to represent the perfect cartel, at its calibrated value from Table 
9 to represent observed behaviour, and at 1/n to represent non-collusive Cournot behaviour. 
 
b The all-manufacturing estimates are derived for illustration by applying equation (1) to the weighted 
average values of the index of non-competitive pricing and the elasticity of demand. 
 
Source:  All values are derived using equation (1) and substituting the elasticities of demand given in Table 
9 and the index of non-competitive pricing, given in Table 10. 
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 Table 12  The nominal rate of protectiona 
 
 
 (per cent) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Agriculture  7 70 13 49 
 
Mining  0 0 9 1 
 
Services  0 0 10 50 
 
Food, beverages and tobacco 8 55 35 28 
 
Garments, textiles and footwear 33 11 42 14 
 
Wood and paper products 13 3 18 10 
 
Chemicals  10 6 51 6 
 
Petroleum and coal products 0 4 27 9 
 
Mineral products  9 3 50 16 
 
Transport equipment 23 2 98 6 
 
Machinery  16 4 41 7 
 
Miscellaneous manufactures 19 5 49 16 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a The proportion by which the domestic price, adjusted for infrastructural costs, exceeds that at the 
border.  The same proportions are assumed to apply to ad valorem tariff equivalents on imports (t) and ad 
valorem export subsidy equivalents on exports (s). 
 
Source:  For Australia the estimates are from Industry Assistance Commission (1987), for Japan 
Saxonhouse and Stern (1989), for the Philippines they are from unpublished data supplied by the Philippine 
Tariff Commission, and for Korea they are from Kim (1988). 
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 Table 13  Effects of trade reform on economic structurea 
 
 (per cent change) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Real GNPb Perfect competition .4 .3  .1  
  Oligopoly, no entry .4 .6 .8 3.2 
  Oligopoly, free entry .4 .3   .6 3.1 
 
Real GDP Perfect competition -1.2 -.2 -4.5  
  Oligopoly, no entry -1.1  .0 -4.6 .5 
  Oligopoly, free entry -1.1 -.1 -5.1 .5 
 
Value added at factor costc 
 Agriculture 
  Perfect competition -.3 -5.7 4.5  
  Oligopoly, no entry -.2 -5.4 4.4 -1.0 
  Oligopoly, free entry -.5 -5.5 4.1 -1.1 
 
 Mining/energy 
  Perfect competition 9.2 1.4 11.4  
  Oligopoly, no entry 9.2 1.4 11.5 1.1 
  Oligopoly, free entry 8.7 1.7 11.7 1.3 
 
 Services 
  Perfect competition .8 .6 5.0  
  Oligopoly, no entry .8 .9 4.9 -1.2 
  Oligopoly, free entry .7 .7 4.7 -1.1 
 
 Manufacturing 
  Perfect competition -3.1 1.2 -6.6  
  Oligopoly, no entry -2.0 1.6 -4.5 3.0 
  Oligopoly, free entry -2.9 1.8 -5.2 3.1 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Three separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  The first pair are constructed on the presumption 
that perfect competition and constant returns to scale prevail in manufacturing.  The others presume 
oligopolistic behaviour with either no entry or exit of firms or free entry or exit. 
 
b GNP includes "transfers" from abroad but excludes repatriated returns on capital (Table 2).  GDP 
excludes the former and includes the latter.  See equations (A1.19) and (A1.19a).  Since the numeraire is a 
Cobb-Douglas index of composite product prices, these results are “real” in that they are relative to 
consumer prices. 
 
c Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) are excluded. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
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 Table 14  Effects of trade reform on real rewards of non-mobile factorsa 
 
 (per cent change in unit rewardb) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Skilled labour 
 Perfect competition  .7  .8  1.5  
 Oligopoly, no entry  .9 1.0 1.7 .1 
 Oligopoly, free entry  .8 1.1 2.2 .1 
 
Unskilled labour 
 Perfect competition .0  .7 3.6  
 Oligopoly, no entry .1  .9 3.5 .1 
 Oligopoly, free entry .0 .9 3.6  .3 
 
Agricultural land 
 Perfect competition -.0 -5.5 4.4  
 Oligopoly, no entry -.1    -5.2 4.3 -1.0 
 Oligopoly, free entry   -.0 -5.2 4.0 -1.0 
 
Mineral resources 
 Perfect competition 8.9  .9 11.2  
 Oligopoly, no entry 9.0 1.1 11.2 2.0 
 Oligopoly, free entry 9.1 1.2 11.7 2.1 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Three separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  The first pair are constructed on the presumption 
that perfect competition and constant returns to scale prevail in manufacturing.  The others presume 
oligopolistic behaviour with either no entry or exit of firms or free entry or exit. 
 
b Proportional changes in unit rewards on those factors which are not internationally mobile, measured 
relative to the price of the consumption basket in the reference equilibrium. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
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 Table 15  Effects of trade reform on imperfectly competitive manufacturinga 
 
 (per cent change, unless otherwise indicated) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Manufacturing capital stock 
 No entry  -2.1 -1.5 -.2 .2 
 Free entry -2.2 .6 -12.3 .1 
 
Pure profitsb 
 No entry  -8 1 -9c 5 
 
Excess rate of return on 
manufacturing capital, no entry case, % 
 Reference 9.4 20.1 -4.7 5.2 
 Trade reform 8.9 20.5 -5.1 5.4 
 
Number of firms 
 No entry  .0 .0 .0 .0 
 Free entry -2.5 .4 -4.7 .3 
 
Value added per firmd 
 No entry  -2.0 1.6 -4.5 3.0 
 Free entry  .7 1.5 -.1 2.5 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  The first pair presumes oligopolistic behaviour with 
no entry or exit of firms while the second allows free entry and exit. 
 
b In the free entry case, pure profits are zero in both the reference equilibrium and the trade reform 
equilibrium. 
 
c In the Philippines, economic losses are enlarged by this proportion. 
 
d Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) are excluded. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
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 Table 16  Effects of non-collusive pricing on economic structurea 
 
 (per cent change) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Real GNPb No entry 1.1 1.6 .8 1.5 
  Free entry 1.9 3.7   2.1 4.4 
 
Real GDP No entry   .7  1.6   .1 -.1 
  Free entry  1.5 2.6  2.0 2.3 
 
Value added at factor costc 
 Agriculture 
  No entry 5.7 15.5 5.4  7.0 
  Free entry 2.6  9.4 3.9  6.9 
 
 Mining/energy 
  No entry 1.6 39.6 -5.8 13.3 
  Free entry  .7 12.3  1.3 9.2 
 
 Services 
  No entry 2.3 7.0  .0  5.3 
  Free entry 2.5 5.2 2.4  5.7 
 
 Manufacturing 
  No entry 14.3 35.3 -3.8 19.5 
  Free entry -5.3 -4.1  1.7 -8.4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared, in each case one having calibrated pricing parameters 
and the other assuming non-collusive or Cournot pricing.  The first pair is constructed on the presumption 
that there is no entry or exit of firms and the second that entry and exit are free. 
 
b GNP includes "transfers" from abroad but excludes repatriated returns on capital (Table 2).  GDP 
excludes the former and includes the latter.  See equations (A1.19) and (A1.19a).  Since the numeraire is a 
Cobb-Douglas index of composite product prices, these results are “real” in that they are relative to 
consumer prices. 
 
c Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) are excluded. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
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 Table 17  Effects of non-collusive pricing on real rewards of non-mobile factorsa 
 
 (per cent change in unit rewardb) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Skilled labour 
  No entry 4.1 14.3 .5 8.7 
  Free entry 1.4 1.6  3.9 -6.2 
 
Unskilled labour 
  No entry 5.3 15.3 1.9 10.0 
  Free entry 4.1 6.8  3.9 8.1 
 
Agricultural land 
  No entry 6.0 15.4 5.3 7.1 
  Free entry 3.3 9.2  3.9 6.6 
 
Mineral resources 
  No entry 2.0 40.0 -6.1 13.1 
  Free entry 1.2 12.0 1.3 9.4 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared, in each case one having calibrated pricing parameters 
and the other assuming non-collusive or Cournot pricing.  The first pair is constructed on the presumption 
that there is no entry or exit of firms and the second that entry and exit are free. 
 
b Proportional changes in unit rewards on those factors which are not internationally mobile, measured 
relative to the price of the consumption basket in the reference equilibrium. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
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 Table 18  Effects of non-collusive pricing on imperfectly competitive manufacturinga 
 
 (per cent change, unless otherwise indicated) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Manufacturing capital stock 
 No entry  5.7 21.7 -6.2 8.0 
 Free entry -28.2 -32.7 -3.0 -33.2 
 
Pure profitsb 
 No entry  -139 -115 15c -200 
 (change as per cent of GDP) (-3) (-11) (1) (-9) 
 
Excess rate of return on 
manufacturing capital, no entry case, % 
 Reference 9.4 20.1 -4.2 5.2 
 Non-collusive pricing -3.4 -2.3 -3.8 -4.8 
 
Number of firms 
 No entry  0 0 0 0 
 Free entry -51 -85 -58 -67 
 
Value added per firmd 
 No entry   14.3 35.3 -3.8 19.6 
 Free entry 93 654 243 280 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Two separate pairs of equilibria are compared.  In each case one has calibrated pricing parameters 
and the other assumes non-collusive or Cournot pricing.  The first pair is constructed on the presumption 
that there is no entry or exit of firms and the second that entry and exit are free. 
 
b In the free entry case, pure profits are zero in both the reference equilibrium and the trade reform 
equilibrium. 
 
c The magnitude of the Philippine loss is reduced by this proportion. 
 
d Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) are excluded. 
  
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
 41
 Table 19  Effects of non-collusive pricing on manufacturing value addeda 
 
 (Per cent change:   no entry case,  free entry case) 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
 
All manufacturing  14,   -5  35,   -4 -4,    2  20,   -8 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco  13,  -13  20,  -18  13,   -8  10,  -15 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear  9,   -1 13,   -2 -2,   -0   6,   -1 
 
 Wood and paper products  20,   -9 27,   -3 -2,    2  16,   -3 
 
 Chemicals   2,    4  45,   -4 -2,    3  18,   -9 
 
 Petroleum and coal products   5,    2  38,  -15 -1,    3  8,    7 
 
 Mineral products  19,   -6 45,   -3 -21,    5 16,   11 
 
 Transport equipment 15,   -5 32,   -3 8,  158  29,  -10 
 
 Machinery  11,   -1  40,   -2 13,    2  39,  -19 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 9,    2 36,    1 -7,    3  30,   -9 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
a Value added at factor cost, as represented here, differs from sectoral GDP in that all capital used is 
valued at the market rate of return (pure profits are excluded) and indirect taxation (tariff revenues 
associated with imports of intermediates) is excluded. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
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 Table 20  Mark-ups in non-collusive pricing equilibriaa 
 
 (Per cent:   no entry case,  free entry case) 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 Australia Japan Philippines Republic 
    of Korea 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
All manufacturingb 4.1,  3.7 .13,  .26 1.0,  2.0 .7,  1.6 
 
 
 Food, beverages and tobacco 1.1,  2.2 .14,  .52 .3,    .6 .9,  2.0 
 
 Garments, textiles and footwear 4.0,  2.5 .19,  .51 .2,    .4 .2,   .3 
 
 Wood and paper products 3.3,  5.6 .18,  .52 .36,   1.3 2.9,  2.3 
 
 Chemicals  15.8,  6.2 .15,  .25 .82,   2.0 2.7,  4.0 
 
 Petroleum and coal products 10.7,  3.5 1.17,  .98 10.8,   3.7 .5,  1.2 
 
 Mineral products 1.3,  2.9 .08,  .22 .78,   2.6 1.4,  4.8 
 
 Transport equipment .6,  2.4 .07,  .23 1.2,  13.6 .12,  1.2 
 
 Machinery  1.8,  2.5 .02,  .04 .47,   1.6 .18,   .8 
 
 Miscellaneous manufactures 10.1,  8.1 .21,  .36 1.5,   2.9 2.1,  2.9 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
a Per cent by which prices exceed average variable cost. 
 
b Arithmetic average of industry mark-ups using value added shares as weights. 
 
Source:  Simulated equilibria calculated using the model presented in Section 2 and Appendix 1. 
 
  
 
 44
 APPENDIX  I 
 THE MODEL 
 This follows the general account in Section 2 of the main text.  A detailed description of the 
model is offered, along with an outline of the steps required for its solution.18  The approach taken is 
illustrated schematically in Figure A1.1.  First, any counterfactual variations in exogenous parameters are 
made.  These might include changes in trade distortions, in the external cost of capital, in technology, as 
reflected in the parameters of the production functions, or in industry structure, as indicated by the fixed 
factor requirements of firms and their conjectural variations. 
 Then initial values are set for the numbers of firms in each industry, reference values for which 
are derived principally from the social accounting matrices (SAMs) presented in Appendix 2.  A "no 
entry" solution, in which the numbers of firms is held constant, is then derived.  This solution iterates on 
the vector [e,w], comprising the exchange rate, e (expressed as foreign currency units per unit of local 
currency) and a vector of non-capital factor rewards, w.  In the reference equilibrium, all elements of this 
vector are unity, and the search for counterfactual equilibria generally begins with these values. 
 Next, product prices and the quantities produced, consumed and traded are calculated, from 
which are derived any foreign payments imbalance or any non-capital factor market excess demands or 
supplies.  Depending on the closure chosen, acceptably small values may be required for these 
disequilibria.  To achieve these targets, the exchange rate and the factor rewards are adjusted and the no-
entry solution recomputed.  If firm entry and exit are permitted, the no-entry solution is tested for 
economic profits or losses in each industry.  If these exceed an acceptable tolerance level, the vector of 
firm numbers in each sector, n, is adjusted and a new no-entry solution is sought.  This process is 
repeated until convergence is achieved and no further incentive remains for firm entry or exit, usually 
within 15 iterations.  In what follows we focus on the analytical structure of the model and its solution. 
                                                 
18 Note that the model is currently operational in an extended version and its solution now uses 
the Gempack software.  Details are offered, along with the Gempack Tablo file, by Tyers 
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The no-entry solution for given [e,w]: 
 The number of representative identical firms, n = [ni, i=1,N sectors] is held constant.  
The rate of return on capital, r, is also exogenous, since capital is homogeneous and 
internationally mobile.  The initial vector of unit rewards to domestic factors is w = [wk, k=1,K 
non-capital factors].  The steps are as follows: 
 
1. Demand elasticities facing domestic industries, ε 
 These must be calculated first, since oligopoly pricing behaviour depends on them.  They 
depend on many other variables in the model, however, so it is best that their formulation be 
described once the core equations of the model have been presented.  For now we will take these 
as given. 
2. Mark-ups over marginal (unit variable) cost 
  We assume constant marginal cost oligopolistic firms in homogeneous product markets. 
 The profit-maximising mark-up is derived by setting marginal revenue equal to unit variable (or 
marginal) cost, v.  The result is 
 
i
i
ii
i i
p 1(A1.1)      =  =            im
v 1 + 
n
µ
ε
∀  , where  ii
i
Q= 
q
µ ∂∂  
and Qi and qi are industry and firm output in sector i, respectively.  Note that µi = 0,1,ni implies, 
respectively, perfect competition, Cournot oligopoly or a colluding cartel. 
 
3. Domestic prices of imported goods 
 
* i i
i
 (1+ )tP(A1.2)      =            ip
e
∀  
Where Pi is the (exogenous) foreign currency price of goods produced in the rest of the world, 
and ti is the equivalent ad valorem tariff rate. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2004). 
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4. Domestic prices of home products 
 Production is Cobb-Douglas in variable factors and inputs, with output elasticities αi for 
capital, βki for factors k and γji for inputs j.  The subaggregation of imported and domestic inputs 
is also Cobb-Douglas, thus assuming unit elasticities of substitution, with expenditure shares on 
home inputs τji.  First, unit variable costs are calculated as: 
 
ji ji jikii
K N
*(1- )
i i k j j
k=1 j=1
(A1.3)      =      [             ip p ]v b wr γβ τ τα ∀∏ ∏  , 
where the scale coefficient, bi, is calibrated from the SAM, as are all the exponents in the 
equation.  Then, domestic prices follow as: 
i ii(A1.4)      =             ip vm ∀  . 
Together, these yield: 
K N N
*
ii i k ji jiki ji jii j j
k=1 j=1 j=1
(A1.5)     log  = log  + log  +  log r +   log +    log  +   (1- )        ip p pb wm β γ γα τ τ ∀∑ ∑ ∑
This is a set of N linear simultaneous equations in pi which is readily solved by matrix inversion. 
 
5. Unit factor and input demands 
 These follow from cost minimisation by firms whose production is Cobb-Douglas in 
variable factors and inputs.  Although these firms are oligopolistic in product markets, they are 
price takers in both factor and input markets.  The unit factor demands for capital and other 
factors, respectively, are: 
 
i iK
i
 v(A1.6)      =         iu r
α ∀  
iL ki
ki
k
 v(A1.7)      =            k, iu
w
β ∀  
 The unit input demands are just Leontief input-output coefficients, except that their 
values depend on product and input prices.  For home-produced and imported inputs, 
respectively, they are: 
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ji iji
ji
j
  v(A1.8)      =            i, jA
p
γ τ ∀  , 
ji iji*
ji *
j
 (1- ) v(A1.9)      =            i, jA
p
γ τ ∀  . 
 
6. Prices of home product exports in foreign markets: 
 These depend on the domestic price, pi, the ad valorem export subsidy rate (with border 
price as denominator), si and the ad valorem equivalent import tariff rate in foreign markets, ti*. 
 
*
e ii
i
i
 e (1+ )p t(A1.10)      =            ip
(1+ )s
∀  . 
7. Exports: 
 Foreigners aggregate home exports and foreign products with elasticity of substitution 
σi* (defined positive).  Their demand for product group i has elasticity -Ωi (where Ωi is also 
defined positive). 
 
* *i ii
*
i
e(1- ) (1- )
i i i i ii
i e
i
  [   + (1- ) p ]E P(A1.11)      =            iX
(p )
ρσ σ
σ
θ θ θ ∀  , where * iii *
i
 -           = 
1 - 
σρ σ
 Ω    . 
When exports are small compared with foreign markets (θi is small), foreign demand for home 
product i has approximate elasticity -σi*, irrespective of foreigners' elasticity of demand for that 
product group.  Ei is also a calibrated constant. 
 Thus far, we have been able to solve directly for domestic and imported product prices, 
the volume of exports and unit factor demands.  Despite the simplifying dependence of this 
solution on an exchange rate and factor prices which are (at this stage) exogenous, solving for 
the other key variables which characterize the equilibrium involves unavoidable simultaneity.  
The additional relationships on which the simultaneous solution is based are those which follow. 
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8. Final demand: 
 Home consumers are assumed to subaggregate home goods and imports with elasticity of 
substitution σi.  They have Cobb-Douglas utility and hence expenditure shares across product 
groups are constant.  Final demand for home goods is therefore: 
 
i
i i
-
i i i
i (1- ) *(1- )
i ii i
 Y  pa(A1.12)      =            iD
  + (1- ) p p
σ
σ σ
δ
δ δ ∀  , 
where ai is the calibrated reference expenditure share of product group i, δi is the corresponding 
share of home goods in final demand for group i and Y is aggregate income (GNP). 
 Similarly, final demand for imports is 
 
i
i i
*-
i iD i
i (1- ) *(1- )
i ii i
 Y (1- ) pa(A1.13)      =            iM
  + (1- ) p p
σ
σ σ
δ
δ δ ∀  . 
Note that, if imports dominate final demand (δi approaches zero), the price elasticity of final 
demand for home goods is approximately -σi.  If, on the other hand, home goods dominate the 
domestic market, the elasticity is approximately -1. 
 
9. Demand for inputs: 
 This is derived from the input-output coefficients and gross industry output, Q.  For 
home inputs of type j it is 
 
N
j ji i
j=1
(A1.14)      =              jQI A ∀∑  . 
For the corresponding imported inputs it is 
N
* *
j ji i
j=1
(A1.15)      =              jQI A ∀∑  . 
 
10. Total imports: 
 This is simply the sum of final demand with intermediate demand for imported goods. 
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D *
i i i(A1.16)      =  +            iM M I ∀  . 
 
11. Gross industry output: 
 In matrix form, where Q=[qi], this is 
 
( ) [ ]1( 1.17)A Q I A D X−= − +  , 
where intermediate demand is implied through the inverse Leontief matrix. 
 
12. Economic profits or losses: 
 This is revenue derived from mark-ups over unit variable costs, less total fixed costs.  
For sector i it is 
K L
i i ii i 1ii(A1.18)      = (  - )  -  (r  +  )          ip Qv wn f fπ ∀  , 
where ni is the number of firms, fiK is the fixed capital requirement per firm and fiL is the fixed 
skilled labour requirement per firm in sector i. 
 
13. National income (GNP): 
 This is the sum of payments to domestically owned factors, the home share of any profits 
or losses made, net income from tariffs and export subsidies and the net inflow of unrequited 
transfers, including financial aid. 
 
K N N N
*D i i
D k i ik i i i
T i ik=1 i=1 i=1 i=1
Bt sK(A1.19)   Y = r  +   +    +     -     + p pwK L M X1+ 1+ et sK
π               ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
where B is the (exogenous) net inflow of aid, borrowings and other unrequited transfers, 
measured in foreign currency.  KD is that part of the capital stock which is domestically owned.  
It is also held constant.  By comparison, the measure of GDP referred to in the paper 
incorporates all income to capital but omits the transfer from abroad. 
 
K N N N
* i i
T k i ik i i i
i ik=1 i=1 i=1 i=1
t s(A1.19a)   GDP = r  +   +   +     -    p pwK L M X1+ 1+t s
π          ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
  
 
 50
14. Total factor demands: 
 In the case of capital, which is infinitely elastic in supply at exogenous interest rate r, the 
capital stock, KT, is the value of capital demanded. 
 
N
K K
T i ii i
i=1
(A1.20)      =  (   +  )QuK n f∑  
 The demand for skilled labour is 
 
N
L L
1 i i1i i
i=1
(A1.21)      =  (   +  )QuL n f∑  
and that for the other factors is 
 
N
L
k ki i
i=1
(A1.22)      =             k = 2,KQuL ∑  . 
 
15. Calculating imbalances: 
 Once the above equations have been used to solve recursively for p*, p, pe, and X, and 
simultaneously for D, I, M, Q, π, Y, KT, and L, any imbalances in foreign payments and 
domestic factor markets can be calculated. 
 Inflows and outflows on the balance of payments are calculated in domestic currency.  
Inflows combine export earnings with net transfers, B (set as exogenous in foreign currency). 
 
N
ii
i=1
B(A1.23)     Inflows =  +   p Xe ∑  
Outflows are repatriated earnings on foreign owned capital, the pre-duty cost of imports and the 
cost of export subsidies. 
*N N N
iD ii
T D ii i
T i ii=1 i=1 i=1
 p M sK(A1.24)     Outflows = r (  - ) + (1 - )  +   +    pK K X1+ 1+t sK
π    ∑ ∑ ∑  
The external imbalance is then 
e
inflows(A1.25)      =  - 1
outflows∆  . 
The corresponding factor market imbalances follow directly from equations (A1.21) and 
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(A1.22), above.  They are 
 
kL
k
k
L(A1.26)      =  - 1           k
L
∀∆  , 
where Lk is the full domestic endowment of factor k.  These imbalances enter the algorithm by 
which the exchange rate and factor prices are adjusted in search of the no-entry general 
equilibrium. 
 
16. The solution algorithm 
 The objective is to calculate the vector [e,w], which we shall call ω, yielding a vector of 
imbalances ∆=[∆e,∆L] which is suitably close to 0.  A variant of Newton's Method is used.  
Extensive use is made of the above no-entry solution for given ω.  At the outset, a matrix of 
derivatives is calculated by imposing small shocks on ω and calculating the associated changes 
in ∆.   This matrix, H, has the following elements: 
where the superscript 0 indicates reference values and superscript 1 indicates those following s 
small shock to ω.  In any iteration m, 
But the objective is to choose the new values of ω, ωm, so that ∆m=0.  Imposing this yields 
Thus, the solution is derived by successive application of (A1.29) until ∆ is within a suitable 
tolerance of 0. 
 
1 0
i i
ij 1 0
j j
0
j
 - (A1.27)      =            i, jh
 - ω ω
ω
∆ ∆ ∀   
 , 
m m-1
m m-1
m
 - (A1.28)      -  = H ω ωω
 ∆ ∆      
m m-1 -1 m-1(A1.29)      =  (1 -  )Hω ω ∆   
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The solution with firm entry and exit 
 Where firm entry and exit are allowed, a common closure requires that this take place to 
exhaust all economic profits.  The objective is then to calculate the vector n which yields 
π(n)=0.  The imbalance used in this case is the excess rate of return on capital. 
 
in
i
i
(A1.30)      =            i
K
π ∀∆  
where Ki is the total demand for capital in sector i. 
 
K K
i i ii i(A1.31)      =   +             iQuK n f ∀  
 The algorithm used is very similar to that used in the no-entry solution to solve for ω.  A 
matrix of derivatives is approximated by first disturbing elements of the vector n slightly and 
using the complete no-entry solution to calculate the resulting changes in π, and hence in ∆n.  An 
adjustment rule identical to equation (A1.29) is then applied at each iteration, until ∆n is within a 
suitable tolerance of 0. 
 
The elasticity of demand facing domestic industries 
 The sources of demand for home products are final demand, intermediate demand and 
export demand.  For sector i, the elasticity sought is a composite of the elasticities of all three 
sources of demand. 
 
F F I I X X
i i i i i i i(A1.32)      =   +   +             is s sε ε ε ε ∀  , 
where s here designates the volume share of the home product in each source of demand.  
Beginning with final demand, differentiating (A1.12) yields 
 
iF i
i i i
i
 p D(A1.33)      = -  +  (  - 1)           i
 Ya
ε σ σ  ∀    , 
where the share in parentheses is that of home goods in final demand for product group i.  Its 
value in the reference SAM is δi. 
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 Turning then to export demand, differentiating (A1.11) yields 
 
* *i i
* *i
e(1- ) (1- )*
ii i i iX i
i e(1- ) (1- )
i i ii
   + (1- )  p P(A1.34)      = -            i
  + (1- ) p P
σ σ
σ σ
θ θ σε θ θ
 Ω ∀   
 
Note that this is a weighted average of the elasticities -Ω and -σ*.  In the likely even that θi is 
small, the approximate value of this elasticity is -σi*. 
 Finally, turning to intermediate demand, we follow Harris (1984) in approximating this 
component elasticity on the assumption that gross sectoral output, Qj, is unaffected by the price 
of any individual input, i.  Analytical expressions for εiI, for the case in which this assumption is 
relaxed, are available on request from the authors.  These lengthy expressions have not been 
used in the current version.  From (A1.14) 
 
N
iji
j
j=1i i
AI(A1.35)      =              iQ
p p
∂∂ ∀∂ ∂∑  . 
Then, expanding Aij using (A1.8) and (A1.3), we obtain the derivative and elasticity: 
 
N
iji
ijij
j=1i i
II(A1.36)      =   (  - 1)           i
p p
γ τ∂ ∀∂ ∑  ,  
N
I I
i ij ijij
j=1
(A1.37)      =   (  - 1)           is γε τ ∀∑  , 
where sijI is the share of industry j in the total intermediate demand for input i.  These 
component elasticities are assembled using (A1.32).  In the solution to the model this is done in 
such a way as to ensure that all the shares, siF, siI, siX and sijI are up-dated at each iteration. 
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Appendix 2: Data Base Construction and Parameterisation of the Model 
 For each country, the parameter set is derived principally from a social accounting matrix 
(SAM).  Each SAM is constructed by reconciling IO tables, aggregated to 12 sectors, with other data, 
including the national accounts, the balance of payments accounts and other subsidiary sources.  Once 
each is complete and in balance, most the parameters of the corresponding model are obtained by 
calibration.  Some, however, such as elasticities of substitution in demand, must be derived from 
independent empirical studies.  The analytical structure of each model, detailed in Appendix 1, assumes 
optimising behaviour at the level of households and firms.  This, and the choice of functional forms for 
utility and production functions, yields behavioural relationships which are readily calibrated directly 
from the SAMs.  The elasticities in the Cobb-Douglas utility function, for example, are observed in the 
consumer's expenditure shares.  
 A summary of the data gathering is presented in Table A2.1 while the parameters and the 
procedures used in estimation and calibration are summarised in Table A2.2.  
 
Construction of the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
 The social accounting matrices of the four countries are presented in Table A2.3 to Table A2.6.  
The primary source for each was an IO table from the mid 1980s.  That for Australia is from 1986, those 
for Japan and the Republic of Korea 1985, and that for the Philippines 1983.  Differences in the 
availability of data for each country make it simplest to discuss the SAMs for each country separately. 
 
Australia and Japan: 
 The IO tables for these two countries classify payments to primary inputs into salaries and 
wages, indirect taxes, depreciation and a residual, operating surplus.  One important task is to allocate the 
sum of these payments among payments to the five factors defined in the model. 
Labour (skilled and unskilled): 
 The first step is to calculate total payments to labour by deducting an estimate of imputed wages 
for agriculture and services from the operating surplus and adding it to the wage bill.  For Australia, the 
estimate was taken from the Australian Industry Commission ORANI database, the information being 
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provided directly by that institution.  The estimate for Japan, on the other hand, assumed the same ratio 
of imputed agricultural and service wage cost to the overall wage bill as in Australia. 
 Payments to labour comprises payments to skilled and unskilled labour.  It is assumed that each 
type of labour is homogenous and that both labour markets are competitive, and hence that the wage rates 
in each labour market are the same in all industries.  Accordingly, total payments to labour in each 
industry is 
and total labour in each industry is 
where Vi is the total payment to labour in industry i; Li is total labour in industry i; Lis is total skilled 
labour in industry i; Liu is total unskilled labor in industry i; ws is the average wage of skilled labour; and 
wu is the average wage of unskilled labour.  Employment by industry was obtained from ABS (1986) and 
ABS (1988) for Australia and from OECD (1990a) for Japan.  For the purpose of apportioning payments 
to labour between skilled and unskilled, the largest and the smallest average wage among the 12 
industries in the aggregated IO table were taken as the skilled and unskilled wage rates, respectively.  
Payments to skilled and unskilled labour were then estimated using equation (A2.1) and equation (A2.2). 
Payments to capital and profits/losses: 
 Payments to capital for all sectors except services were calculated as the product of the interest 
rate  and the capital stock of the sector.  Estimates of Australia's capital stock in agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing were taken from ABS (1988b).  The capital stock in manufacturing was disaggregated 
according to Hagan (1991).  Capital stock levels for each sector in Japan were taken from the OECD 
International Sectoral Database, access to which was provided by the ANU International Economic Data 
Bank.  In the services sector, the operating surplus net of imputed wages is regarded solely as the return 
to capital.  No reliable independent estimate of either the return to service capital or the service capital 
stock is available. 
 In the benchmark equilibrium, represented in the SAM, the number of firms (and hence the fixed 
capital stock) is considered fixed.  Firms are therefore earning pure (economic) profits or losses.  These 
i i i
s us u(A 2.1)      =  + V w wL L   
i i i
s u(A 2.2)      =  + L L L   
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were estimated by deducting payments to capital from the operating surplus.  On the other hand, each of 
the three industries characterised as perfectly competitive (agriculture, mining and services) is assumed 
in the benchmark equilibrium to be in a position of long run competitive equilibrium.  Thus, no pure 
profits are being earned. 
Land and mineral resources: 
 Agriculture is specified as the only sector using land.  Payments to land were obtained by 
deducting payments to capital from the operating surplus net of imputed wages.  Likewise, mining is the 
only sector using mineral resources and payments to mineral resources are given by deducting payments 
to capital from the operating surplus. 
Fixed capital and labour costs: 
 In each manufacturing industry in the model, capital and skilled labour are assumed to include 
both fixed and variable components.  Payments to skilled labour derived from the input-output table and 
payments to capital imputed from the capital stock data only provide information on the total (fixed plus 
variable) primary factor costs.  In order to apportion these primary factor costs between fixed and 
variable components, a modified version of the procedure adopted by Harris (1984) was used. 
 In the absence of empirical estimates of fixed costs incurred by manufacturing firms, a cost 
function is postulated and values of fixed capital and labour costs are derived which are consistent with 
this cost function.  The assumed cost function, C, has the functional form, 
 
s(A 2.3)     C(w, r, p, q) = q h(w, r, p) + r K +  Lw  
where q is firm-level output; K 1 is the fixed capital requirement; L 2 is the corresponding fixed labour 
requirement; r is the rental rate of capital; w is the vector of variable factor rewards, in which the reward 
for skilled labour, from which fixed labour is drawn, is ws; p is the vector of other input prices; and h is 
average variable cost.  The problem is to identify r K  and ws L . 
 The average total cost (AC) curve of the firm is assumed to be monotonically decreasing and 
approaches average variable cost h(w,r,q) asymptotically.  The minimum efficient scale (MES) of the 
firm is defined to be that level of output at which average cost is 1 per cent greater than average variable 
cost.  Thus, MES is implicitly defined by the equation 
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m
m
m
C( )q(A 2.4)     AC( ) =  = 1.01 h(w, r, p)q
q
9 
where qm is the MES.  Given the definition of the MES, the following also holds, 
where s is the percentage by which average cost exceeds average variable cost at an output level one-half 
of the MES.  Following Harris (1984), this represents the "slope" of the long run average cost curve. 
 Alternatively, average cost at one-half MES can be written as 
 
s
m
m m
r K Lw(A 2.6)     AC(0.5 ) = h(w, r , p) +  + q
0.5 0.5q q
11 
 Equating (A2.5) and (A2.6) and rearranging yields the expression 
 
s m(A 2.7)     r K +  L = (0.01 + 1.01s) h(w, r, p)  0.5qw 12 
which has three unknowns r K , ws L  and h(w,r,p). 
 To obtain an expression for total fixed cost in terms of the slope, MES and total cost, substitute 
(A2.1) into (A2.7) and rearrange terms. 
 
m
s
m
0.5q  (0.01 + 1.01s)
q(A 2.8)     r K +  L =  Cw 0.5q1 +  (0.01 + 1.01s)
q
      
13 
Estimates of total cost, C, were taken from the SAM.   The slope coefficients, taken from Gupta and Fuss 
(1979), were aggregated up to a twelve sector level by taking weighted averages using United Nations 
production data, expressed in value terms, as supplied by the International Economic Data Bank (IEDB). 
The estimation of the minimum efficient scale (MES) is discussed in the next section. 
 In order to allocate total fixed cost between capital and labour, it is assumed that the ratio is 
proportional to the ratio between total payments to capital and total payments to labour 
 
T
s us us
r K r K(A 2.9)      = (1 + ) 
 +  L w wL Lw
ε  
where sectoral super and subscripts, i, are dropped for convenience.  Estimates of total payments to both 
capital and labour were taken from the SAM.  Following Harris (1984), a value of five was used for the 
m(A 2.5)     AC(0.5 ) = (1 + s) 1.01 h(w , r , p)q   
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parameter ε .  Payments to fixed capital and fixed labour, expressed as a percentage of total payments to 
capital and labour are presented in the main text, in Table 6.  The return to mobile capital and skilled 
labour were estimated by deducting the value of fixed capital and labour from the total costs of capital 
and skilled labour, respectively. 
Matrix of imports used as intermediate inputs: 
 An import matrix was not available for Japan.  The vector of total imports from the 1985 IO table 
was therefore disaggregated into a matrix using the same proportions from the country's 1975 import 
matrix taken from the Institute of Developing Economies (1981). 
 
Philippines: 
 Payments to primary factors in the 1983 IO table were classified into "salaries and wages" and 
operating surplus.  The latter includes unrecorded labour income in family farms or firms, return to 
capital and possible pure profits.  The first step was to allocate operating surplus into the five factors of 
the model. 
Land and mineral resources: 
 Following the assumption of Evenson and Sardido (1986), the return to land in agriculture was 
assumed 30 per cent of total factor payments in that sector.  On the other hand, mineral resource rent in 
the mining sector was assumed 40 per cent.  This is a best guess in the absence of reliable information. 
Labour (skilled and skilled): 
 As in the case of the Australian and Japanese SAMs, imputed income which includes the income 
of owner-operators and unpaid family workers was estimated for both the agriculture and services sectors 
only.  Such income was assumed to make up 24 per cent and 59 per cent of total labour income in these 
sectors, respectively.  These assumptions were roughly based on the percentage excess of total 
employment over the total number of employees recorded.  Total employees are defined to include all 
persons who work in or away from establishments (firms), receive compensation and are under the 
control of the establishments.  On the other hand, total employment includes total employees as defined 
above and working owners and unpaid family workers who work for the establishments but are not on 
the regular payroll (NCSO 1987).  The imputed income was then added to the value of labour income in 
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the IO table to arrive at total labour income. 
 Estimation for the return to skilled and unskilled labor was the same as in Australia and Japan.  
Data on skilled and unskilled wage rates from UN (1989) were reconciled with the average wage rates in 
each industry derived using the labour income in the IO table and employment data from NSCB (1988) 
and NCSO (1987).  To apply equations (A2.1) and (A2.2), the levels of employment were drawn from 
NSCB (1988) and reclassified according to the 12 sectors in the model.  This required the adaptation of 
the distribution of employment in manufacturing industries from NCSO (1987). 
Payments to capital and profits/losses: 
 The economic return to capital and pure (economic) profits were derived as the residual 
operating surplus after deducting imputed labour income, returns to land and returns to mineral resources. 
 For the perfectly competitive industries (agriculture, mining and services), these residuals were taken to 
be market returns to capital only.  In the benchmark equilibrium characterised by the SAM, the 
nine manufacturing industries are assumed to be earning pure profits or making losses. 
 At first, market returns to capital were separated by using Hooley's (1985) estimates of capital 
stock in the manufacturing sector and assuming a nominal rate of return of 22.5 per cent throughout.  It 
was immediately apparent, however, that these estimates of the capital stock were too small.  Residual 
pure profits emerged in all manufacturing sectors and these were of ridiculous proportions (ranging from 
50 per cent of total value added in textiles, garments and footwear to 94 per cent of that in petroleum and 
coal products).  Such results were quite implausible considering that 1983 was a year of pervasive losses 
in the manufacturing sector.  The residuals of the operating surplus in the imperfectly competitive 
industries were therefore allocated between return to capital and profits/losses by using, instead, Hooley's 
shares of the overall capital stock across manufacturing sectors and assuming that manufacturing as a 
whole made less than the market return on its capital in 1983 (by about 4 per cent; see Austria 1992). 
 First, consider only the manufacturing sectors (i=4,12).  The actual rate of return on all capital in 
these sectors combined is observed as rm and the yet unknown capital stock in those sectors is Km.  The 
total payment to each manufacturing industry is known from the IO table as gi and Hooley's (known) 
industry share of all manufacturing capital is ki.  The values of πi (i=4,12), the unknown profits/losses in 
each industry, and Km are then readily obtained from following conditions. 
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i m m ii(A 2.10)      =  (  ) +   ,        i = 4,12g k r K π  
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i=4
(A 2.11)       = (  - r) r Kπ∑  
where r is the market rental rate of capital.  Once π and Km are known, the following conditions on the 
presumed competitive sectors, agriculture, mining and services (i=1,3), make it possible to estimate the 
overall capital stock and, thereby, market returns to capital in all sectors. 
 
ii i(A 2.12)      = 0 ,      = r  ,       i = 1,3g Kπ  
 
3
T m i
i=1
(A 2.13)      =  +  K K K∑  
Fixed capital and labour costs: 
 Fixed capital and labour costs were estimated by the same method as that employed in the cases 
of Australia and Japan.  Payments to fixed capital and labour, as a percentage of total payments to those 
factors are presented in the main text, in Table 6. 
 
Matrix of imports used as intermediate inputs: 
 An import matrix recording the use by each industry of imported inputs classified by sector of 
origin was not available.  An import matrix was therefore constructed by distributing the vector of total 
imports, drawn from the IO table, across sectors using the shares of each sector in total output. 
 
Republic of Korea: 
 The 1985 Korean IO table classifies payments to factor inputs into four groups, namely 
compensation of employees, operating surplus, capital consumption allowances and indirect taxes less 
subsidies.  For each sector, the operating surplus, which is computed as a residual, includes returns to 
labour and capital and possible pure profits. 
Land and mineral resources: 
 Payments to land in the agriculture sector were based on the factor proportions observed by Kim 
and Park (1979).  Payments to mineral resources are derived as a residual, after those to labour and 
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capital have been calculated. 
Labour (skilled and unskilled): 
 The level of employment and the average wage rate in each industry were taken from Monthly 
Statistics of Korea, National Statistics Office, Republic of Korea.  Skilled labour is defined as university 
and college graduates.  The average wage rates for these two categories are chosen from the work of Bai 
(1990).  Once these rates are known, resort to equations (A2.1) and (A2.2) yields the division of 
payments to the two factors. 
Payments to capital and profits/losses: 
 Payments to capital are estimated by using the capital stock in each industry, drawn from Hong 
(1988), and an assumed universal rate of return on capital (the interest rate on long term borrowings, set 
in 1985 at an average of 9.5 per cent per year) drawn from the Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin.  
Profits/losses in the imperfectly competitive industries were estimated by deducting from the total value 
added reported in the 1985 IO table payments to capital and labour and tariff revenue to the government. 
Fixed capital and labour costs: 
 The approach taken to the estimation of fixed capital and labour costs was the same as for the 
other economies modelled.  Payments to fixed capital and labour as a percentage of total payments to 
capital and labour are presented in Table 6. 
 
Number of Firms 
 The choice of a measure for the number of identical firms in each imperfectly competitive sector 
is important in determining the response in mark-ups to changes in collusive behaviour (equation A1.1).  
Moreover, it is also important in estimating the extent of any unrealised scale economies, via 
comparisons of average firm output with the corresponding MES, estimates of which are discussed in the 
next section.  To do both these things well would require a very high level of disaggregation of the 
manufacturing sectors of all four economies, beyond the resources available to this project.  The 
necessity to work with only 12 industry categories stretched the assumption that firms in each are 
identical.   Since the distribution of firm size in such broadly defined industry categories often includes a 
modest number of very large firms and a large number of small firms.  We chose to interpret this pattern 
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as representing small numbers of oligopolistic leading firms depending upon large numbers of relatively 
competitive suppliers of components.  It is then most realistic to model this as an oligopoly among the 
large firms, each of which incorporates its suppliers of components. 
 In applying this characterisation, the key problem is to determine the cut-off point in firm size 
between the large and small firms.  We did this judgementally.  In all four countries, the size distribution 
of manufacturing firms is available.  We tended to choose the largest size category available for each 
country.  For the Philippines, this includes firms with 200 or more employees (WB 1987); 300 or more 
employees for Japan (Statistics Bureau 1986); and 500 or more employees for Australia (ABS 1989) and 
the Republic of Korea (UN 1987). 
 
Estimation of Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) 
 Independent estimates of minimum efficient scale are not available for manufacturing in the four 
countries studied.  The original sources used were therefore the econometric estimates by Gupta and Fuss 
(1979) for various ISIC three-digit and four-digit level industries in Canada in 1968.  These estimates 
were adapted to all four economies on the assumption that the MES in each industry is the same in 
physical units as that in Canada.  There were considerable difficulties, however, in the adaptation 
between industry classifications and across time. 
 A first approach was to  use commodity production data for Canadian manufacturing industries, 
given in terms of physical quantity units, to convert the Gupta and Fuss estimates into those units.  For 
the four countries, production data in physical units was available at no higher aggregation than 6-digit 
ISIC, and data in value terms was disaggregated at no more than 4-digit ISIC.  The idea was to calculate 
a weighted average of the MES figures associated with the 6-digit classifications to determine an MES in 
physical quantity units for each 4-digit class.  Then for each 4-digit class, the MES could be calculated in 
value terms by dividing the MES in physical units by the physical production of the 4-digit class and 
multiply this ratio by the production of the 4-digit class in value terms.  The MES for each sector is then 
a weighted average of the MES for the 4-digit classes within each sector. 
 The practical problem with this approach was that taking a weighted average in the first stage 
and then converting to value terms both require calculation of total production in physical units for a 4-
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digit class.  The first and fundamental problem is the lack of uniformity of units within a 4-digit class (the 
necessity, for example, to add metric tonnes of raw wool to metres of wool yarn).  Secondly, there are a 
large number of 6-digit classes within each 4-digit class, ensuring an unacceptable number of 
approximations (since inconsistent units are required for each 4-digit total). 
 A second approach was to translate the Gupta and Fuss (1979) MES estimates across to the four 
economies in units of value.  The MES figures for the industries considered by Gupta and Fuss were 
aggregated to the sector classification of the model, with the number of firms in each industry used as 
weights.  For this method, the vector of MES estimates (in 1968 Canadian dollars) needed to be 
expressed in mid-1980s Canadian dollars, for conversion to the currencies of the four economies.  For 
this purpose, the producer price series from OECD (1990) was used.  The figures for MES were then 
converted at surrounding three-year average market exchange rates drawn from the IMF's International 
Financial Statistics (various issues).  Purchasing power parity rates from Summers and Heston (1991) 
were also tried, though these appeared to enhance rather than resolve inconsistencies in the results, to 
which we now turn. 
 The important parameter in the equation for fixed cost (equation A2.8) is not the absolute value 
of the MES, but its value as a proportion of the output of the firm.  As outlined above, however, we 
considered a firm to be one which is sufficiently large to alter product prices.  Ideally, therefore, a firm 
size consistent with this definition should be used.  For example, in Japan, a firm includes only those 
with 300 or more employees.  Were data available for the output of this class of firms (by sector), then 
dividing by the number of firms within this class would yield a more appropriate firm size for the 
purpose of equation (A2.8).  Such data was not available, however.  Moreover, it is insufficient to simply 
divide the total output in each classification by the number of firms in the narrow class of interest.  In 
most cases, small firms produce a significant proportion of the value of output so that this quotient 
overestimates the average product in the focus firms. 
 Ultimately, average firm size in the four economies was approximated by dividing output in each 
classification by the number of firms using a definition of firm consistent with that used by Gupta and 
Fuss (all firms, excluding the smallest class, generally those with less than five employees).  The 
resulting estimates of the ratio 3 seemed overly high, so much so that payments to fixed capital from 
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(A2.8) occasionally appeared to exceed all payments to capital.  They were nevertheless useful as 
indicators of relativities between the sectors.  The final figures adopted, which are indicated in the main 
text in Table 6, preserve these observed relativities but have been adjusted to maintain realistic ratios of 
fixed to total capital. 
 
Elasticities of Substitution and Export Demand Elasticities 
 In the absence of econometric estimates for each country on the elasticities of substitution 
between imports and domestic goods and between domestic exports and world exports for the industry 
classification of the model, these two sets of elasticities are assumed to be identical.  The values used are 
drawn from the surveys by Industry Commission (1991) and Stern, Francis and Schumacher (1976). 
 
Constant Terms in the Production and Cost Functions 
 The Cobb-Douglas production function underpinning the technology assumed in the model has 
the form, 
 
ji jiji jii ki
K N
*(1- )
i i ki ji jii
k=1 j=1
(A 2.14)      =        Q A K L I I
γ γτ τβα ∏ ∏  ,4 
where Lki is the quantity of mobile factor k used in the production of i, Iji is the corresponding volume of 
intermediate input j, and its asterisked counterpart refers to imported inputs.  The constant coefficient Ai 
is determined by rearranging the production function in terms of Ai and calculating with all variables at 
their benchmark equilibrium values. 
 From the production function, the unit variable cost function (A1.3) is derived.  The constant 
term in the function, bi, has the value 
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Table A2.1  Summary of data gathering and calibration of the model 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Symbol Variable Sources Procedure 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Qi Gross output (1) IO table Sectoral totals from (1). 
 
pi, p*i Product prices (1) IO table IO table defines units so all 
prices are 1 in the reference 
short equilibrium. 
 
wk Return to non-
capital factor 
inputs 
 See main text of this 
appendix. 
 
r Return to 
capital 
(1) AU: INDECS 
(1990) 
(2) JA: IMF (1987) 
(3) PH: WB (1987) 
(4) KO: Bank of Korea 
(1990) 
Interest rate on long term 
borrowing was used. 
 
KT Total capital 
stock (domestic 
and foreign) 
(1) AU: ABS (1988); 
Hagan (1991) 
(2) JA: OECD sectoral 
database 
(3) PH: See main text of 
this appendix 
(4) KO: Hong (1988) 
See main text of this 
appendix. 
 
KD Domestically 
owned capital 
stock 
(1) IO table 
(2) AU: Horridge 
(1987)  
(3) JA: OECD sectoral 
database 
(4) PH: Kunio (1985) 
(5) KO: Gunasekera and 
Tyers (1991) 
Total capital stock from (1) 
broken down according to 
domestic share from (2) - 
(5). 
 
Lk Domestic 
endowment of 
non-capital 
factor inputs 
(1) IO table See main text of this 
appendix. 
 
ψ Share of 
domestic 
ownership in 
industry 
(1) AU: Horridge 
(1987) 
(2) JA: OECD 
(3) PH: Kunio (1985) 
(4) KO: Gunasekera and 
Tyers (1991) 
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πi Pure 
profits/losses 
(1) IO table See main text of this 
appendix. 
 
fiL, fiK Fixed labour 
and fixed 
capital 
requirement per 
firm in the 
imperfectly 
competitive 
industries 
(1) I/O table See main text of this 
appendix. 
 
mi Mark-ups of the 
imperfectly 
competitive 
industries 
(1) SAM Each column total of the 
SAM corresponding to each 
production sector divided by 
the respective column total 
of net of fixed costs and 
profits. 
 
ti Domestic ad 
valorem tariff 
(1) AU: IAC (1987) 
(2) JA: Saxonhouse and 
Stern (1989) 
(3) PH: Philippine 
Tariff Commission 
(4) KO: Kim, K-S 
(1988) 
 
 
ti* Foreign ad 
valorem tariff 
rate 
(1) Whalley (1980) 
(2) Deardoff and Stern 
(1984) 
(3) IEDB, ANU 
Based on (1), (2) and (3), 
weighted averages were 
calculated. 
 
si Domestic 
export subsidy 
rate 
(1) AU: IAC (1987) 
(2) JA: Saxonhouse and 
Stern (1989) 
(3) PH: Gregorio (1979) 
(4) KO: Kim, K-S 
(1988) 
 
 
Xi Exports (1) IO table  
 
Mi Imports (1) IO table  
 
Y Total 
expenditure by 
households and 
government 
(1) IO table  
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Iij Intermediate 
demand for 
domestically 
produced good 
of industry i 
used by 
industry j 
(1) IO table  
 
I*ij Intermediate 
demand for 
imported good 
of industry i 
used by 
industry j 
(1) IO table  
 
ni Number of 
firms in the 
imperfectly 
competitive 
industries 
(1) AU: ABS (1989) 
(2) JA: Statistics Bureau 
(1986) 
(3) PH: WB (1987) 
(4) KO: UN (1987) 
See main text of this 
appendix. 
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Table A2.2   Summary of parameters and their estimation 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Symbol Parameter Source Procedure 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
αi, βki, 
γij 
Production function 
parameters 
(1) SAM Parameters based on share 
data from Cobb-Douglas 
production function. 
 
τij Share parameter in the 
composite intermediate 
input price index 
(1) SAM Cobb-Douglas function 
parameters based on share of 
domestic intermediate 
product j in total j used in the 
production of i. 
 
ai Share parameter in the 
utility function 
(1) SAM Share of consumption in 
commodity i in total 
consumption expenditure. 
 
Ai Constant term of the 
production function 
(1) SAM Based on output and factor 
usage of sectors in the 
reference SAM and Cobb-
Douglas production 
parameters.  See main text of 
this appendix. 
 
bi Constant term in the unit 
variable cost function 
(1) SAM Based on the constant term 
of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function.  See 
main text of this appendix. 
 
δi Distribution parameter 
for domestically 
produced goods in 
domestic final demand 
(1) SAM Domestic share in total final 
demand for each sector. 
 
θi Distribution parameter 
for home country 
exports 
(1) IO table 
(2) IEDB, ANU 
Share of each country's 
exports in total world 
exports. 
 
Ωi Price elasticity of world 
export demand 
(1) Stern, 
Francis and 
Schumacher 
(1976) 
(2) IEDB, ANU 
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σi Elasticity of substitution 
between imports and 
domestically produced 
goods 
(1)  Industry 
Commission 
(1991) 
(2) Stern, 
Francis and 
Schumacher 
(1976) 
See main text of this 
appendix. 
 
 
σi* Elasticity of substitution 
between domestic 
exports and rest of the 
world exports 
(1) Industry 
Commission 
(1991) 
(2) Stern, 
Francis and 
Schumacher 
(1976) 
See main text of this 
appendix. 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE A2.3   Social Accounting Matrix, Australia, 1986 (million dollars) 
  P/L K S/L U/L LAND Nat  R Instins 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ROW  TOTAL 
Factors Profits and Loss        0 0 0 1355 492 1209 764 963 855 -300 318 325  5981 
 Capital        2639 4107 65879 1512 175 1153 462 543 2529 780 750 404  80933 
 Skilled Labour        0 2515 53562 1286 88 1248 791 406 2872 866 1070 470  65174 
 Unskilled Labour        3872 876 65468 2480 1587 2783 670 0 2739 1563 1787 872  84697 
 Land        4127 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  4127 
 Mineral Resources        0 4405 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  4405 
Institutions 5981 80933 65174 84697 4127 4405 2808 60 110 1306 91 392 272 138 87 145 484 259 104 5029 256602 
Production  1  Agriculture       2360 1473 37 525 7660 829 383 13 4 2 1 1 6 5324 18618 
 2  Mining       840 10 1493 2387 48 5 43 118 1921 2737 11 18 91 9261 18983 
 3  Services       192380 2892 3046 65642 4492 1472 3068 1863 2533 4972 1390 2051 979 10454 297234 
 4  Food, beverages & tobacco       14649 803 64 1337 3310 17 61 244 13 18 10 8 274 4785 25593 
 5  Garments, textiles & ftwear       4453 53 17 570 45 1845 183 22 47 118 72 37 109 1052 8623 
 6  Wood and paper products       3381 86 81 7754 544 52 2496 182 84 319 116 162 78 534 15869 
 7  Chemicals       1568 820 256 1655 129 67 268 1556 590 308 79 156 828 513 8793 
 8  Petroleum & Coal products       2868 1013 192 3826 95 11 94 93 738 628 13 30 18 655 10274 
 9  Mineral Products       1918 29 400 8718 991 18 284 271 148 7370 988 1426 100 4790 27451 
 10 Transport Equipment       5581 30 20 2393 8 0 8 3 23 16 1836 13 2 773 10706 
 11 Machinery       5019 73 314 3355 31 3 55 11 40 122 160 839 9 977 11008 
 12 Misc. manufactures       994 41 131 1720 532 275 262 224 51 148 301 333 563 365 5940 
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R of  world 1  Agriculture       198 46 0 139 262 4 7 2 0 0 0 0 55   
(imports) 2  Mining       38 7 44 19 0 0 10 64 755 187 0 0 6   
 3  Services       1657 53 157 2235 167 15 97 10 134 83 32 48 17   
 4  Food, beverages & tobacco       1351 8 3 96 196 0 3 21 2 1 3 0 14   
 5  Garments, textiles & 
footwear 
      1276 22 17 198 27 1105 111 2 31 69 29 16 99   
 6  Wood & paper products       717 25 16 444 40 6 1222 29 17 45 15 18 11   
 7  Chemicals       274 222 93 529 53 35 142 1037 521 203 15 46 321   
 8  Petroleum & coal products       222 80 20 517 8 1 7 29 478 65 1 2 2   
 9  Mineral products       344 5 58 1091 31 5 93 26 13 708 184 250 23   
 10 Transport equipment       3054 13 46 727 0 0 0 0 0 2 1709 3 0   
 11 Machinery       7769 83 381 4344 82 17 193 104 114 129 174 1194 9   
 12 Misc. manufactures       886 35 85 802 114 105 116 45 16 60 177 171 156   
 TOTAL 5981 80933 65174 84697 4127 4405 256605 18620 18984 29723 25589 8621 15871 8794 10272 27450 10709 11000 5940   
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TABLE A2.4   Social Accounting Matrix, Japan 1985  (100 million yen) 
  P/L K S/L U/L LAND Nat  R Instins 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ROW  TOTAL 
Factors Profits/Loss        0 0 0 38655 5291 9151 28141 25876 50424 28194 90598 30160  306490 
 Capital        37968 1127 723764 6956 4061 6427 8558 5135 19294 10270 23341 7391  854292 
 Skilled L        15182 6821 783352 30142 2701 1210 2260 9488 34871 54724 66951 48101  1055804 
 Unskilled L        8841 1241 737122 26212 25964 24653 27136 0 50071 20792 84541 16051  1023834 
 Land        36663 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  36663 
 MinResources        0 5227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  5227 
Institutions 5981 306490 854292 1055804 1022624 36663 5227 9003 1140 11 2748 17880 3488 5978 1720 102 600 104 539 174 -112790 
Prodn  1  Agriculture       41136 19566 56 12218 96364 1342 4865 234 0 14 3 1 1708 794 178301 
 2  Mining       604 0 68 1850 0 1 246 197 13494 7525 7 58 103 155 24308 
 3  Services       2307499 21545 8053 788687 51759 25145 27532 45836 13613 91360 49082 120267 40429 87362 3678169 
 4  Food, b & t       255365 16621 0 48347 50550 299 162 239 0 32 0 0 1295 2915 375825 
 5  Gmt, tx & ft       63848 1123 35 10962 290 42252 849 0 27 507 666 752 3052 10999 135362 
 6  Wood paper       17879 1971 45 55735 6015 1292 37847 4053 0 2607 668 4024 18353 3005 153496 
 7  Chemicals       21840 6945 95 41886 3564 9088 4461 71399 95 5595 4807 8412 29511 21705 229403 
 8  Petr & Coal       23966 2816 177 78704 1678 1293 3141 14557 9449 17425 1463 2130 783 3701 161283 
 9  Mineral       16291 444 404 130575 8677 363 4414 3521 596 214418 31996 71557 4826 49872 537954 
 10 Transp Eq       89477 746 3 40135 4 0 0 1 1 6 140463 200 0 116528 387564 
 11 Machinery       259746 1323 349 45008 1540 547 846 2112 1496 6954 21966 185993 2299 163878 694057 
 12 Misc. mfg       48381 1585 231 81759 6244 3024 6896 3389 287 2178 18088 19970 36684 14534 243250 
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R o W 1  Agriculture       4124 1342 0 1207 17965 4639 8216 356 2 5 0 0 90  37676 
imports 2  Mining       0 0 5 32702 0 1 77 1199 78685 14643 0 41 29  127382 
 3  Services       8625 271 100 35436 882 582 408 1594 368 1258 635 1121 215  51495 
 4  Food, b & t       7570 178 0 1619 9357 0 0 1604 5 1 0 0 30  20364 
 5  Gmt, tx & ft       5534 101 2 793 12 3515 84 143 10 58 46 37 206  10541 
 6  Wood paper       353 13 1 2632 25 15 5320 63 12 45 7 135 107  8728 
 7  Chemicals       2028 766 57 5232 405 387 374 7288 316 106 4 252 32  17247 
 8  Petr & Coal       3901 974 152 9206 420 210 172 3039 2198 2280 82 341 95  23070 
 9  Mineral       804 127 44 2335 229 47 165 758 28 15605 555 5134 858  26689 
 10 Transp Eq       3762 0 0 2257 0 0 0 0 0 0 1837 0 0  7856 
 11 Machinery       13441 2 4 688 2 0 0 3 0 73 908 7384 49  22554 
 12 Misc. mfg       6624 47 0 1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 195 276 620  9058 
 TOTAL 30649 854292 1055804 1022624 36663 5227 3211797 178301 24308 3678169 375825 135362 153496 229403 161283 53795 387564 694057 243250   
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TABLE A2.5   Social Accounting Matrix, Republic of Korea, 1985 (billion won) 
  P/L K S/L U/L LAND Nat  R Instins 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ROW  TOTAL 
Factors Profits and 
Loss 
       0 0 0 657 91 -182 140 871 -502 -148 2252 192 0 3371 
 Capital        945 112 14582 908 537 65 204 1760 447 904 1272 68 0 21805 
 Skilled L        0 0 5304 271 161 15 156 593 258 430 546 58 0 7792 
 Unskilled L        4118 306 23443 1686 1728 137 453 1302 905 615 2495 300 0 37487 
 Land        4644 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4644 
 Mineral Res        0 410 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 410 
Institutions 5981 3371 21805 7792 37487 4644 410 571 59 1 809 674 571 239 39 426 14 85 367 24 1374 
Prodn  1  Agriculture       4930 1363 28 201 7488 46 10 6 3 0 0 0 5 563 14643 
 2  Mining       50 12 0 256 5 3 0 4 568 320 76 13 6 38 1351 
 3  Services       46101 746 252 15574 1350 1432 209 524 2244 583 927 3010 266 5637 78855 
 4  Food, b & t       12250 1242 0 1614 1633 46 0 8 61 0 1 0 1 507 17363 
 5  Gmnt, txtl  
ft 
      1937 35 2 191 9 4859 8 18 398 4 5 63 351 6019 13899 
 6  Lumber       303 26 28 513 7 5 185 21 15 4 12 101 24 138 1382 
 7  Paper       329 17 3 1089 221 114 11 1057 163 72 9 129 62 131 3407 
 8  Chemicals       2705 1040 112 5358 524 1876 85 239 4231 308 610 984 231 3437 21740 
 9 Non-,metals       42 5 1 1966 135 7 9 15 100 502 83 230 16 265 3376 
 10 Basic metal       0 6 15 1169 9 9 4 35 50 17 3913 2447 69 1600 9343 
 11 Machinery       6617 121 71 2903 141 83 32 27 207 82 124 4131 118 8138 22795 
 12 Misc mfg       433 3 1 208 33 24 0 1 14 1 1 9 14 1243 1985 
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R o W 1  Agriculture       95 15 0 0 1130 612 470 3 162 0 0 0 3   
(imports
) 
2  Mining       0 0 0 233 0 0 0 4 5829 262 473 1 5   
 3  Services       381 72 0 1251 32 26 1 16 67 2 2 61 8   
 4  Food, b & t       191 2 0 13 340 303 0 0 58 0 0 0 0   
 5  Gmnt, txtl  
ft 
      42 3 0 2 0 946 1 3 81 0 0 4 66   
 6  Lumber       13 0 0 14 0 0 52 9 0 0 0 15 11   
 7  Paper       16 0 0 49 31 7 1 334 32 1 1 28 4   
 8  Chemicals       97 148 0 911 64 331 20 78 2431 35 42 267 29   
 9 Non-,metals       28 0 0 66 0 0 0 3 13 36 42 124 6   
 10 Basic metal       11 0 0 53 0 1 0 1 5 0 1061 860 8   
 11 Machinery       3565 21 9 1069 13 29 10 9 52 25 75 3382 30   
 12 Misc mfg       56 0 0 13 2 52 0 0 4 0 0 3 11   
 TOTAL 3371 21805 7792 37487 4644 410 80763 14643 1351 78855 17363 13899 1382 3407 21740 3376 9343 22795 1985   
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TABLE A2.6   Social Accounting Matrix, Philippines, 1983 (million pesos) 
  P/L K S/L U/L LAND Nat  R Instins 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ROW  TOTAL 
Factors Profits / Loss        0 0 0 10451 -3561 -4184 -4341 1831 -9077 -9354 1152 -1108 0 -18192 
 Capital        8351 7221 61478 15112 10918 8115 12454 605 17391 11498 14742 6196 0 174083 
 Skilled Labour        0 6659 83780 8232 2555 683 2543 102 1896 1687 10086 2728 0 120950 
 Unskilled L        51129 2307 40476 2610 2718 1526 654 0 860 561 1905 531 0 105277 
 Land        25735 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25735 
 Mineral Res        0 10557 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10557 
Institutions -18192 174083 120950 105277 25735 10557 19205 19205 935 161 4780 889 958 274 728 1314 1310 584 1612 824 23269 
Prodn  1  Agriculture       42108 7240 42 2601 54264 1320 5574 47 0 0 0 0 1453 3318 117966 
 2  Mining       1635 10 0 1037 0 0 3 74 19340 1947 1 58 2 6197 30303 
 3  Services       185542 7949 1193 48438 13684 2755 2539 2454 5559 3381 764 3277 1961 29211 308706 
 4  Food, b, t       87158 7095 0 4851 22727 0 0 2708 0 0 0 0 221 12752 137514 
 5  Gmnts, 
textiles & ftwr 
      16330 63 0 319 131 7257 150 5 0 8 0 12 254 6838 31367 
 6  Lumber       4597 290 17 8233 211 41 2891 145 16 107 17 135 74 3946 20718 
 7  Paper       8304 3852 369 2998 561 785 601 3158 426 411 67 419 1363 629 23944 
 8  Chemicals       10478 2476 865 17471 3607 1027 1196 632 339 2528 60 508 307 1607 43098 
 9  Non-metals       5421 146 324 11634 842 17 153 505 101 8374 501 3387 140 1725 33271 
 10 Basi Metals       5590 76 2 1605 11 2 7 2 21 2 926 5 2 255 8506 
 11 Machinery       29271 141 68 3319 30 16 60 211 10 53 97 4472 12 8689 46262 
 12 Misc. 
manufactures 
      6585 64 118 3322 259 2319 174 551 66 163 320 686 3545 2101 20273 
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R o W 1  Agriculture       1542 246 1 88 1842 45 189 2 0 0 0 0 49   
(imports
) 
2  Mining       5242 7 0 694 0 0 2 49 12945 1303 1 39 2   
 3  Services       7418 275 41 1673 473 95 88 85 192 117 26 113 68   
 4  Food, b, t       3107 221 0 151 707 0 0 84 0 0 0 0 7   
 5  Gmnts, 
textiles & ftwr 
      3243 9 0 45 18 1016 21 1 0 1 0 2 36   
 6  Lumber       654 22 1 630 16 3 221 11 1 8 1 10 6   
 7  Paper       2843 1226 117 954 179 250 191 1005 136 131 21 133 434   
 8  Chemicals       1182 242 85 1708 353 100 117 62 33 247 6 50 30   
 9  Non-metals       1733 35 79 2822 204 4 37 123 24 2031 122 822 34   
 10 Basi Metals       2832 37 1 778 5 1 3 1 10 1 449 3 1   
 11 Machinery       20548 77 37 1797 16 9 33 12 5 29 53 2420 6   
 12 Misc.       2686 20 36 1027 80 717 54 170 20 50 99 212 1096   
 TOTAL -18192 174083 120950 105277 25735 10557 475251 117966 30303 308706 13751 31367 20718 23944 43098 33271 8506 46262 20273   
 
 
